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ABSTRACT

Many scholars have demonstrated that labor mobility between firms has lead to the
economic success of Silicon Valley. California's policy against enforcing covenants not to
compete has been shown to provide the legal infrastructure for high labor mobility. Does
the argument extend to mobility of skilled labor across national borders? This Article
addresses that question in the context of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, the first
federal criminal trade secret law in the United States. By analyzing the scholarly
literature and the case law under the Act, the author presents a theoretical framework for
assessing the Act based on international trade theory. The Article concludes that there
are policy reasons to be skeptical about the Act and several reforms could ease the
potential chilling effect of the Act on the mobility of skilled labor. Such reforms include
replacing the criminal provisions of the Act with a private civil cause of action and
expanding extraterritorial application of both patent and trade secret laws.
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INTRODUCTION

A recurring metaphor in intellectual property law is that of boundaries. 1 At the
heart of patent law, for example, are the metes and bounds of the invention as
determined by the written claims.2 Within copyright, scholars debate the legal
borders of the market for the protected work in determining when the adaptation
right of the copyright owner has been infringed. 3
Trademark rights are
circumscribed by geographic boundaries and the borders of the product space that is
being branded. 4 Finally, a group of intellectual property scholars have recently
turned their attention to how intellectual property aids in constructing the
boundaries of the firm. 5 Outside the field of intellectual property, real and virtual
boundaries are policed through national security law, cyberspace law, and
immigration law. This Article focuses on the intersection between boundaries in
intellectual property law and those in immigration policy. The Economic Espionage
Act of 19966 provides a case study of how intellectual property law is used to police
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1 See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License Contracts: Tales
from a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 336 (2009).
2 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure
Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.Cir.2004)).
3 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing the GreyAlbum, 59
ALA. L. REV. 345, 402-03 (2008) (discussing the boundaries of derivative work protection under
copyright law).
4 See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1368-69 (1996) (describing the geographic scope of trademark rights).
5 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing
IntellectualPropertyRights at the Boundaryof the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 576-77 (2007).
6 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. Law. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2006)).
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real world boundaries across which people and ideas move. 7
The Act also
demonstrates how intellectual property law has expanded its own boundaries by
moving beyond a legal tool to regulate markets and competition to a tool to police
political and economic concerns of domestic security and information control. Like
the work on intellectual property and the boundaries of the firm, this Article presents
the argument that intellectual property also serves to define the boundaries of the
nation-state. Two foundational concepts are at play in this Article: the movement of
people and the movement of information. Immigration law and policy governs the
movement of people across national borders. Movement of people within national
borders but across regional borders (such as between states or cities) is governed in
the United States by the right to travel and federal and state laws that regulate the
movement of people in response to new employment opportunities, state programs,
and changes in family situations.8
Movement within national borders is not
considered part of immigration law and policy for the purposes of this Article
although federal immigration law can affect the mobility of individuals within
national borders. The movement of information is governed by intellectual property
law and policy. 9 If information is protected by intellectual property law (for example,
when it becomes embodied in a patentable invention or in a fixed and original work
of authorship), then the movement of information, however embodied, becomes a
matter of how it can be distributed and copied under the terms of the relevant
intellectual property doctrine. 10
The movements of people and information, for the most part, are split in theory
between the domains of immigration law and policy and intellectual property law and
policy. Professor Kevin Johnson, an immigration law scholar, has persuasively made
the case for "open borders," or the permissive movement of people across national
borders.11 Intellectual property law, however, often restricts the movement of
information across borders by allowing intellectual property owners to police national
borders to prevent the importation of infringing materials. 12 This paper advances the
7 See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be Allowed to
Hide Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1
(1998) (acting as the first academic commentary discussing the Economic Espionage Act of 1996).
Professor Dreyfuss' key concern that the Act unnecessarily turns trade secret misappropriation into
a federal crime is a concern that I share and emphasize in this Article. See id. at 18.
8 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, amend. XIV, § 1; Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-04 (1999)
(interpreting the right to travel in the United States as three different types of travel between
states); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (protecting undocumented immigrant access to
education); Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild: College Residency and the Response to
Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 104-106 (2008) (examining the pre-emption of federal
immigration policy on state legislation that restrict access to services); see also Steven L. Winter,
Indeterminacy and Incommensurabilityin ConstitutionalLaw, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1513 (1990)
(examplifying the constitutional right to travel and relationship to immigration).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2006) (trademark); 17 U.S.C. §§ 1011332 (2006) (copyright); 18 U.S.C. 1831-39 (trade secret); 35 U.S.C. § 1-376 (2006) (patent).
1017 U.S.C. § 106; 35 U.S.C. § 271.
11 KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES:

WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS

BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 168-69 (N.Y.U. Press 2007) ("[Allowing all residents of the
United States, regardless of their immigration status, full membership in U.S. society is consistent
with the democratic principles for which this nation proudly stands.").
1219 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2006) (making it unlawful to import articles that infringe United States
intellectual property laws).
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case for open borders in the area of intellectual property law by demonstrating how
the movement of people and movement of information across borders are closely
connected.
In practice, information is often embodied in people through knowledge and
ideas, and the movement of one may affect the movement of the other. Professor
Michael Olivas has documented how the increased scrutiny of immigration after the
attacks of 9/11 has affected universities and graduate students. 13 In the world of
commerce, rules on employee ownership and use of intellectual property, obviously,
can affect the movement of employees as they seek new opportunities or attempt to
form start-ups and new ventures. 14 This phenomenon has been studied extensively
by AnnaLee Saxenian, Alan Hyde, and Ronald Gilson, each of whose scholarship has
demonstrated the role of formal law and informal norms in structuring high-velocity
labor markets and fueling innovation. 15 These scholars, however, have focused
largely on regional markets, such as Silicon Valley or Route 128.16 Scholars have
paid less attention to the effects of labor mobility across national borders on high
velocity labor markets. Recent scholarship by Professors Saxenian and Hyde has
integrated international migration into the respective studies of high-velocity labor
markets. 17 Professor Saxenian, for example, has explored what she calls "the new
argonauts," or high-skilled immigrants who enter to United States to fill temporary
spots in high technology labor markets.' 8 Professor Hyde has also integrated the
phenomenon of H- 1B visa holders into his theory of internal labor markets and high
technology industries. 19 This Article, however, is the first attempt to explore
systematically how intellectual property, through the Economic Espionage Act, acts

13

Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The Dream Act, and Undocumented College Student Residency,

30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 457-63 (2004).
14See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 473-74, 493 (1974) (ordering the
reinstatement of a permanent injunction against ex-employees from divulging or using the former
employer's trade secrets to the ex-employees' new venture).
15 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology IndustrialDistricts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 596-601 (1999)
(discussing Silicon Valley firms' ability to "prevent knowledge spillovers through employee
mobility."); Alan Hyde, The Wealth of Shared Information: Siicon Valley's High-Velocity Labor

Market,EndogenousEconomic Growth, and the Law of Trade Secrets (1998) [Hereinafter Hyde, The
Wealth of Shared Information], http://andromeda.rutgers.edu-hyde/ (follow "Silicon Valley: The
Wealth of Shared Information; Some Economics of Nonrivalrous Information" hyperlink) (analyzing
Silicon Valley's work force mobility and laws affecting that mobility). See generally ANNALEE
SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE:

CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128

29-57 (Harv. U. Press 1996) [hereinafter SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE] (comparing and
contrasting the differences between Silicon Valley and the Route 128 Corridor in Massachusetts).
16SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 29-82; Gilson, supra note 15, at 586-94;

Hyde, The Wealth of SharedInformation,supra note 15.
17 ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY:

ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-

VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 125-39 (M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 2003) [hereinafter HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON
VALLEY]. See generallySAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15 (analyzing the movement
of migrant workers to and from the Silicon Valley).
18

ANNALEE SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS: REGIONAL ADVANTAGE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY

50-52 (2006) [hereinafter SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS] (documenting how changes in
immigration law and policy in the 1990's affected Silicon Valley workforce).
19HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17, at 134-39 (offering an economic analysis
of H 1-B visa program targeted to increase entry of highly skilled workers into the United States).
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as a type of immigration policy, that is using legal instruments to regulate the
°
movement of people across national borders through the movement of ideas.2
The Economic Espionage Act makes the theft of trade secrets either across
international borders or domestically a federal crime. 2 1 Section 1831 criminalizes the
theft of a company's trade secret for the benefit of a non-United States. entity or
government. 22 Indictments and convictions under section 1831 largely affect nonUnited States nationals who are either employed in the United States or travel to the
United States and have been found to have engaged in the theft of a trade secret
within the United States for the benefit of either a foreign business entity or a
foreign sovereign. 23 To label the Economic Espionage Act as immigration policy is
potentially misleading since section 1832 of the Act does not have the requirement of
benefit to a foreign entity. 24 Instead, this provision criminalizes any theft of a trade
secret that is harmful to the trade secret owner. 25 Therefore, convictions under
section 1832 could be brought against United States citizens who have stolen trade
secrets for United States companies. 26 However, the breadth of section 1832 would
permit convictions against non- United States citizens and against acts that benefit
foreign entities. 27 While it would certainly be misleading to label the Economic
Espionage Act solely as an example of immigration policy, it would not be misguided
to claim that the Act affects the movement of people across national borders because
of the express language of section 1831 and the broad language of section 1832.28
The attention paid to economic espionage and the use of federal resources to combat
it arises from documented concerns about efforts by several countries, including
Cuba, China, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan to misappropriate United States defense and
industrial technologies. 29 The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
warns, as part of its annual report to Congress on economic espionage dating back to
1995, about the threat to United States technology from espionage that arises in

20 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The ProblematicRole of CriminalLaw in Regulating the Use of
Information: The Case of the Economic EspionageAct, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853, 908-10 (2002) (touching

briefly on the Hyde-Saxenian-Gilson theories of labor mobility). I am grateful to the foundation laid

by Professor Mohr's important article and build on her insights through a more systematic use of
trade theory and interdisciplinary analysis. See R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. Trade Secret
Assets: CriticalAmendments to the Economic EspionageAct of 1996, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 658 (2008) (discussing the Economic Espionage Act and a proposing to amend its provision
to include a private civil cause of action to protect trade secret assets).
21 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2006).
22 Id. § 1831.
23 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, First Foreign Economic Espionage Indictment;
Defendants Steal Trade Secrets from Cleveland Clinic Foundation (May 8, 2001) [hereinafter First
Foreign Indictment], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/OkamotoSerizawalndic
t.htm (announcing the indictment of a Japanese national under section 1831).
24 See 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
25 Id.
26 See id.
27 Id.
28 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-32.
29 See 1 STEVEN Z. SZCZEPANSKI & DAVID M. EPSTEIN, ECKSTROM'S LICENSING IN FOREIGN

AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS § 8A:23 (2009) ("National security seems to be another concern which

has spurred the implementation of the Economic Espionage Act.").
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industry, government facilities, conferences, conventions, and trade shows. 30 The
Economic Espionage Act has the effect of immigration policy. 3 1 In fact, many of the
cases brought under the Act are against non-United States citizens. 32 It is this
phenomenon that I will be examining.
While the Economic Espionage Act, an instrument for making trade secret
misappropriation a federal crime, is a unique development in intellectual property
law, the criminalization of trade secret and its effects on the immigration and
emigration of labor is not new. Professor Doron S. Ben-Atar has documented the role
of industrial espionage in the propagation of technology as far back as the
Seventeenth Century. 33 England countered the practice of industrial espionage by
limiting the emigration of industrial labor and criminalizing the act of enticing
English industrial workers overseas. 34 Restrictions on the movement of labor can be
traced back to the Roman Empire where skilled artisans were legally bound to their
employer. 35 Social restrictions also bound skilled labor as, for example, in the case of
the glass blowers of Murano who were required to remain on the island several miles
off the coast of Venice in order to preserve the secrets of the trade. 36 The enactment
of the Economic Espionage Act in 1996 is perhaps just another indication of the shift
in the United States legal climate from tolerating intellectual property piracy (in the
Nineteenth Century) to protecting intellectual property rights vigorously (in the late
Twentieth Century).37 What is difficult is the harnessing of federal prosecutorial
power to the protection of trade secrets when legal scrutiny has typically rested in
state civil litigation. 38 The broader historical context of the Economic Espionage Act
motivates the need for scrutiny of the use of restrictions on labor mobility across
national borders as a tool of intellectual property policy.
Casting intellectual property law in terms of the movement of ideas and people
is an original turn in this Article. My broader point is to reorient our understanding
of intellectual property, both as scholars and policymakers, in terms of international
30 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN

ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE

2 (2007)

[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT],

available at http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie-all/fecie_2007/FECIE-2007.pdf.
31See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-32 (including attempt and conspiracy to misappropriate trade
secrets).
32 See, e.g.,

First

33 DORON S.

Foreign Indictment, supra note 23.

BEN-ATAR, TRADE

SECRETS:

INTELLECTUAL PIRACY AND THE

ORIGINS OF

AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER 12-13 (Yale Univ. Press 2004).
34 BEN-ATAR, supra note 33, at 13 ("All in all ten major laws were passed between 1695 and
1799 [by England] against emigration of artisans and the export of machinery.").
35 See A. Aurthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law, The Actic Servi Corrupti
30 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 837-38 (1930).
36See Francesca Trivellato, Murano Glass, Continuity and Transformation (1400-1800), in AT
THE CENTER OF THE OLD WORLD: TRADE AND MANUFACTURING IN VENICE AND THE VENETIAN

MAINLAND, 1400-1800 157-60 (Paolo Lanaro ed., Ctr. for Reformation & Renaissance Studies 2006)
(describing system of guilds that protected secrecy of glass production). See also BEN-ATAR, supra
note 33, at 10 (describing the Venice glass production scenario, comparing it with British sulfuric
acid producers at the time of the British Industrial Revolution).
37 See BEN-ATAR, supra note 33, at 9 (describing prevalence of technology piracy globally in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries).
38 See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537-659 (2005)
(creating a private civil cause of action for an alleged trade secret misappropriation); Trade Secrets
Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/1-9 (2009) (same).
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trade. Consequently, a good portion of this Article will be devoted to understanding
the movement of ideas and people in terms of international trade theory. In some
ways, the reliance on international trade should not be surprising. 39 The European
Community and European Union case law on intellectual property contains a
sizeable body of disputes regarding parallel importation, an area that brings the
movement of ideas in conflict with the movement of goods. 40 In these cases,
especially those involving pharmaceuticals, the commitment to the free movement of
goods within Europe trumped intellectual property rights. 41 Within the United
States, the tension between intellectual property rights and the free movement of
goods has played itself out largely within the area of the first sale doctrine rather
than through norms of international trade. 42 The Economic Espionage Act, however,
does pose the question of whether a commitment to intellectual property rights
should trump any commitment to the free movement of people across borders. In
43
practice, intellectual property rights do trump through the application of the Act.
This Article answers the question of whether they should.
My analysis of this normative question begins with a reconsideration of the
Saxenian-Hyde-Gilson arguments about regional markets in the broader context of
international trade. There are many reasons why the arguments about innovation
and labor movements do not carry over to the movement of people across national
borders. 44 Concerns over the negative externalities of national security and classified
information as well as the scale effects of national, as opposed to regional markets, I
argue, may minimize the concerns that scholars have demonstrated over restrictions
on labor mobility in regional markets. Although these counter arguments are
important, I place them in the perspective offered from the theory of international
trade 45 to conclude that other compelling arguments weigh in favor of a cautious
enforcement of the Economic Espionage Act. Specifically, both the traditional theory
of international trade, with its support for free trade, and more contemporary
theories that focus on returns to scale and knowledge spillovers support this cautious

39

See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,

32 I.L.M. 289 (creating a free trade bloc between the United States, Canada, and Mexico as of Jan.
1, 1994).
40 See Lawrence W. Gormley, Silver Threads Among the Gold... 50 Years of the Free
Movement of Goods, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1637, 1687-90 (2008) (discussing free movement of
goods principle in European Union).
41 See Case C-267/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285 (allowing imports of
patented pharmaceuticals under European exhaustion of patent rights principle consistent with free
movement of goods); Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal Standard GmbH,
1994 E.C.R. 1-2789 (adopting exhaustion principle for importation of trademarked product); see also,
Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int'l Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH,
1998 ECR 1-4799 (applying European exhaustion principle to prevent importation of trademarked
goods from outside European Union).
42 See, e.g., Quality Kings Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 140-44
(1998) (permitting importation of copyrighted works under first sale doctrine).
43 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2006).

44 See, e.g., HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17, at 125-26.

45 See AVINASH K. DIXIT & VICTOR NORMAN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 146-49 (1980)
(presenting economic analysis of effects of labor migration on international trade); PAUL KRUGMAN,
GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE 72-83 (1991) (presenting economic model of regional development in the
context of global trade using theory of returns to scale and externalities).
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approach. 46 I conclude that the concerns that underlie support for the Economic
Espionage Act can best be balanced with the norms of international trade through a
combination of more targeted enforcement of the Act and a broader application of
extraterritorial application of both the Patent Act and trade secret law. In short,
intellectual property law should not be used as a vehicle for immigration policy and
should be more narrow and purposive in application.
The structure of this Article is as follows. Section I, which follows, presents the
arguments for and against restrictions on labor mobility from within the SaxenianHyde-Gilson perspective as supplemented by economic theories of international
trade. Section II assesses the Economic Espionage Act in light of this augmented
theory. Section III presents policy recommendations for rethinking the Economic
Espionage Act and for reforming collateral areas of intellectual property law,
specifically the law of patents and trade secrets.
This article concludes by
demonstrating how my arguments in this Article point to a general theory of
intellectual property and international trade.

I.

HIGH VELOCITY LABOR MARKETS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

There is a rich scholarly literature on the movement of information as embodied
in the movement of people. 47
Economic geographer AnnaLee Saxenian's
ethnographic study of high technology labor markets in California and
Massachusetts laid the foundation for the work of legal scholars like Alan Hyde and
Ronald Gilson to build the legal and market analysis of how labor mobility affects
technological innovation. 48 This body of scholarship demonstrates how the movement
of people influences the movement of information which fuels the diffusion of
49
knowledge.
While this scholarly literature is well-known, little attention has been paid to
the international or global context within which these high technology labor markets
operate. Although both Professors Saxenian and Hyde have turned to the role of
international migration in supplying high technology labor markets in the United
States, the policy conclusion largely focus on regional migration.5 0 This focus is
reflected in the policy implications gleaned from the studies to assess trade secret
and employment law, the provenance of state and local, rather than national,
governments. 5 1 Assessing the Economic Espionage Act and related international

See DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 146-49.
47 See generally SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18 (discussing the worldwide
growth of the high-technology industries based on the movement of labor into and out of Silicon
Valley); HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17 (detailing Silicon Valley's movement of
labor).
48 See generally SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15 (comparing and contrasting
the legal and economic differences between Silicon Valley and Route 128).
49 See, e.g., id. at 29-57 (analyzing Silicon Valley's movement of labor).
50 See id. at 162-68; HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17, at 125-39.
51 See generally Chris Carr et al., The Economic EspionageAct: Bear Trap or Mousetrap, 8
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159 (2000) (discussing trade secret misappropriation across national
borders).
46
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intellectual property policies requires exploring the intersection of the existing
literature on high velocity labor markets and international trade.
This intersection is the focus of this section, which begins first with a survey of
the existing theory and an identification of the problems of extending the existing
work of Professors Saxenian, Hyde, and Gilson to the realm of international trade. I
address these problems by a careful consideration of international trade theory and
its implications for high velocity labor markets. This analysis provides a foundation
for addressing the implications of the international movement of people for the
international movement of information. How intellectual property and the crossborder movement of labor and ideas intersect is the key contribution of this section
and is critical for the assessment of the Economic Espionage Act.

A. Existing Theory
The importance of labor mobility to innovation and growth in high technology
sectors has been documented by Professors Saxenian, Hyde, and Gilson. 52 Scholars
have built on their insights to develop a deeper understanding of intellectual
property protection within a firm and between firms. 53 Owners of intellectual
property can enjoin the use of protected information and knowledge by existing
employees as well as competitors outside the boundaries of the firm. 54 The scope of
intellectual property rules then determines the extent of competition arising from
55
other firms as well as from current employees and agents of an existing firm.
Inter-firm and intra-firm competition, in turn, drive innovation and growth through
processes of creative destruction and cumulative innovation. 56 In this section, I
summarize the conventional wisdom in order to develop the argument, in the
following section, that the conventional wisdom may not apply to trade across
national borders. I ultimately reject the arguments against the conventional wisdom
and show how it can be modified to address the phenomenon of high velocity labor
markets in international trade.
Professor Saxenian set the terms for our understanding of high technology labor
markets in her comparative study of Silicon Valley and Route 128. 57 Both labor
markets functioned in the booming software industry, but Professor Saxenian noted
52 See generallySAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15 (comparing and contrasting

the differences between Silicon Valley and the Route 128 Corridor in Massachusetts); Gilson, supra
note 15 (comparing the laws applicable to Silicon Valley with those applicable to the Route 128
Corridor); Hyde, The Wealth of Shared Information, supra note 15 (analyzing Silicon Valley's work
force mobility and laws affecting that mobility).
53 See Burk & McDonell, supra note 5, at 592 (offering an analysis of within firm and across
firm competition and intellectual property rights); Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural
Monopoly, Deregulation, and Intellectual Property, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 1172-78 (2008)
(offering a broader discussion of competition, intellectual property rights, and innovation, and

analyzing the role of competitive pressures on innovation and structure of intellectual property
doctrine).
54 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 473-74, 493 (1974).
55 See Gilson, supra note 15, at 595-613.
56 See SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 44.

57 See generally id. (discussing the differences between Silicon Valley and the Route 128
Corridor in Massachusetts).
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that the California market was notably more dynamic with greater turnover in
58
workforce and a larger number of start-ups than the East Coast counterpart.
Appropriately, since her perspective was that of a cultural anthropologist, the main
explanation offered for the difference was a cultural one. 59 The West Coast labor
market was defined by greater freedom and sense of innovation while the East Coast
one was more conventional, tied to traditional corporate business models.6 0 Professor
Saxenian's early work set the tone for much of the subsequent scholarship pursued
61
by legal scholars Alan Hyde and Ronald Gilson.
Particularly noticeable is the focus on regional markets. Professor Saxenian
treated Silicon Valley and Route 128 as two self-contained ecosystems, each defined
by unique cultural norms and history.6 2 No attention was paid to movements into or
out of the two ecosystems, across either regional or national borders.6 3 Instead, the
two ecosystems were painted as largely self-contained with differences in economic
outcomes resulting from differences in the values based on innovation, the mentality
of start-ups, and the dead-hand of tradition.6 4 In recent work, Professor Saxenian
has expanded her focus by incorporating international immigration into her
analysis.65 High skilled workers, who have been granted permission to enter the
United States on HI-B visas, fuel much of the growth in Silicon Valley.6 6 These
"global Argonauts," as Professor Saxenian dubs them, 6 7 fill a skill gap in the labor
market, and the high velocity, short-term nature of the employment is defined by the
terms of the entry visa.68 These international workers arrive, Professor Saxenian
69
argues, in response to cultural and economic pressures from the source country.
The short-term economic gains motivate the labor movement, and the skills they
bring as well as the limited cultural commitments to the host country serve the needs
of start-ups and other smaller firms that thrive in the dynamic ecosystem of Silicon
Valley. 70 International migration of labor fits into the cultural story that Professor
58 Id. at 30-35, 59-69 (describing the work cultures of Silicon Valley and Route 128,
respectively).
59 Id. at 161-63 (reflecting on cultural differences between Silicon Valley and Route 128).
60 Id. at 2-3.
61 See generally HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17 (analyzing Silicon Valley's
work force mobility); Gilson, supra note 15 (analyzing Silicon Valley's work force mobility and laws

affecting that mobility).
62 See SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 29-82.
63 Id.

64 Id. at 2-4.
65 See generally SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18

(analyzing the immigration

and emigration patterns of multiple peoples into the United States as related to employment in high

technology fields).
66 See id. at 50-54 (detailing the increasing numbers and economic power of immigrants
working in Silicon Valley).
67 Id. at 11.

68 See Bruce A. Lehman, Intellectual Property Rights as a Trade, Health and Economic
Development Issue, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 417, 424 (2003) (discussing the enormous
impact of immigrants on Silicon Valley's growth, and the H1-B visa's role in allowing companies to
meet their labor shortages).
69 See SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18, at 50-52 (detailing the numbers of
immigrants who came to study in the United States following World War 11, and the job
opportunities that awaited them).
70 See id. at 48-50.
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Saxenian tells. 71 These new workers thrive on existing ecosystems without upsetting
72
them.
Professor Alan Hyde draws on the same data as Professor Saxenian but uses the
study of high technology labor markets to better understand the economics of the
employment relationship.7 3 Professor Hyde sees the dynamics of Silicon Valley as a
challenge to the traditional human capital explanation of employment, which sees
labor markets as a way of acquiring and developing skills that are a critical input to
the production of goods and services. 7 4 According to human capital theory, a worker
spends the early part of his career acquiring skills through education. 75 Once the
general skills are acquired through education, more firm specific skills are acquired
through employment in a firm.76 The life cycle of the worker entails the worker
earning less than one's marginal product during the training phase in order to offset
training costs.7 7 After training, however, the worker's wages are above productivity
so that the worker can recoup the investment in training.7 8 Human capital theory
would predict that labor relationships are stable and long term and arise from a joint
79
investment in training between the employee and the firm.
As Professor Hyde emphasizes, the reality of high velocity labor markets in the
technology sectors belies the prediction of human capital theory.8 0 In Silicon Valley,
employees often leapfrog from firm to firm and even more frequently leave existing
employers to form their own start-up.8 ' Knowledge flows with employees and often
former employers can do little to enjoin exiting employees or share in the fruits of
their success.8 2 What is particularly vexing for human capital theory is that this type
of mobility, which seemingly contradicts the incentive structure for long term
investment and the stability of the firm, supports innovation and growth.8 3 Professor
Hyde uses this challenge to conventional wisdom to rethink economic analyses of
employment relationships.8 4 The solution to the puzzle rests on recognizing that the
employment relationship entails not only the inculcation of skills through training
but also the creation and propagation of knowledge. 8 5 Labor markets are markets
not only for people, who embody human capital or expend physical effort to perform
tasks, but also tacit markets for information.8 6 The efficient propagation of
71

See id. at 82-121 (detailing the flow of immigrants back to their home countries, using Israel

as a model, that created technology centers in their home countries with strong connections to
Silicon Valley).
72 See id. at 50 (describing how Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs have integrated into the
"mainstream technology economy" while maintaining their cultural identity).
73See HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17, at 71-89.
74 See id. at 83-87.
75See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at
Wif,92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 13 n.18 (1993).
76See id. at 13-15.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17, at 85.
81See id. at 29-30.
82 See id. at 29-33 (discussing how California does not enforce non-compete covenants).
83 See id. at 15-16, 85-87.
84
See id. at 71-89.
85 See id. at 29-30, 44, 86.
86
See id. at 69.
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information may not occur simply through stable, long term investments between the
employer and employee.87 Instead, employees may see the value of information that
becomes developed in different forms of technical knowledge and know-how and
proceed to take the information outside existing firms and into new entities and
opportunities.8 8 The Silicon Valley model has structured employment relationships
89
in order to unleash this market for information.
While Professor Saxenian adopts a cultural explanation for high technology
labor markets, Professor Hyde develops a market-based explanation, grounded in
economic theory.9 0 Although the two authors differ in methodology, the two authors
share a regional focus. 91 Professor Hyde's early work portrayed Silicon Valley as a
self-contained ecosystem driven by the economic logic of information and employment
markets. 92 More recent work examines the phenomena of HI-B visa workers and
93
places regional markets in the broader context of international migration.
Professor Hyde concludes that economic theories of international migration that rest
on wage differential or labor shortages cannot account for the phenomenon of high
skilled, short term immigrant labor. 94 As he points out, much of the benefit of the
HI-B visa program can be realized through outsourcing and through filling the skill
gap by hiring domestic labor. 95 Furthermore, if the HI-B visa program is viewed as a
form of political rent seeking, it is not clear whether it is the immigrants or the firms
that are seeking the rents. 96 The problem, as Professor Hyde states, is the difficulty
in determining the appropriate baseline against which to measure the correct level of
immigration. 97 The deeper problem, in my opinion, is that the theory of high
technology labor markets has largely focused on regional markets rather than global
markets. Both Professor Saxenian and Professor Hyde present a comparative
analysis of contrasting economic and legal environments. 98 But this comparative
analysis does not readily translate to an understanding of markets that are globally
integrated through the movement of people and information. This limitation makes
it difficult to use their analysis to assess the Economic Espionage Act and its
implications for the international migration of people and the cross-border flow of
information.
Professor Gilson extends the work of Professor Hyde to the evaluation of legal
rules and institutions. 99 Specifically, Professor Gilson builds on Professor Hyde's
87
88

See id. at 83-85.

See id. at 29.
89 See id. at 29-32.
90 Compare SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 2 (focusing on the cultural
evolution of Silicon Valley and route 128), with HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17,
at xii, 41-70 (developing an economics theory of employment).
91 See generally HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17 (focusing on Silicon
Valley); SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15 (focusing on Silicon Valley and the Route
128 Corridor).
92 See Hyde, The Wealth ofSharedInformation, supra note 15.
93 See HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17, at 128-39.
94 See id. at 134-38.
95 See id. at 136-38.
96 Id. at 135.
97 Id.
98 See id. at 49-53; SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 29-82.
99 See Gilson, supra note 15, at 577.
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description of high velocity labor markets as markets for information to analyze the
property rights over knowledge that is generated through employment
relationships. 10 0 If the market for labor is a market for information, then there is a
spillover that is created when knowledge is created.10 1 Enjoining an employee from
leaving a firm to use the knowledge created through the prior relationship limits the
spillover effect. 10 2 Therefore, the prohibition under California law against enforcing
covenants not to compete' 0 3 lends flexibility to the labor market and promotes the
realization of spillovers from the creation of new firms. 0 4 At the same time, the
protection of trade secrets both across and within firms allows a firm to develop firmspecific knowledge that is proprietary in its benefits. 10 5 As a result, the California
legal regime allows the market for information to function efficiently in both the
106
creation and dissemination of knowledge.
While Professor Gilson's analysis is more legalistic in understanding the
appropriate regime of property rights over information than either Professor
Saxenian or Hyde, his explanation is regional in its implications. 10 7 The emphasis is
on state employment rules that allow the realization of externalities within regional
markets.108 An obvious question is to what extent are these arguments applicable
nationally and globally. California's legal regime governing employments and trade
secrets favors the mobility of workers and of spillover-inducing information, but
limitations on the movement of firm-specific knowledge. Generalizing the argument
to the global level: the movement of workers across borders is desirable to the extent
that it induces cross-border spillovers but suspect if it misappropriates firm specific
knowledge. 10 9 If it is sensible to make this generalization, then the Economic
Espionage Act is a sensible piece of legislation to the extent it balances this twin
movement of people and of information. 110 There are reasons, however, to question
this generalization.1 11 In the next two sections, I first examine the problems of
making the generalization and second explain how the theory of international trade
can help to understand how to build on existing theories of high velocity labor
markets to understand the international movement of people and information.

100 Id.at 595.

101 Id.
102 Id. at 596-97.
03 See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP,
189 P.3d 285, 297 (Cal. 2008) (finding
noncompetition agreement between defunct accounting firm and former employee invalid).
104

105
106
107

See Gilson, supra note 15, at 607-09.
See id.at 597.
See id.at 608-09.
See id.at 620.
See id.at 579.

108
109 See Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not To Compete in a Knowledge Economy. Balancing

Innovation from Employee Mobiity Against Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 295 (2006) (discussing the economic impact of the immigration of
human capital to the United States).
110 See Carr, supra note 53, at 209 ("[Tihe EEA has nevertheless filled a significant gap in the
protection of trade secrets and has been an important and positive step forward in the battle against
trade secret theft.").
"I See, e.g., James H.A. Pooley et al., Understandingthe Economic EspionageAct of 1996, 5
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 197 (1997) (questioning the effect of the Economic Espionage Act on
arguably legal forms of reverse engineering).
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B. Why Existing Theory May Not Apply to InternationalLaborMobility
Arguments for easing labor mobility among high technology firms in sectors like
Silicon Valley and Route 128 do not extend to ease of mobility across international
borders. There are three salient distinctions: (1) issues of national security, (2) the
existence of scale economies, and (3) the normative foundation of intellectual
property law in the welfare of the nation-state rather than the global economy. In
this section, I present each of these objections in order to address them and to lay a
foundation for the discussion of international trade theory in the following
subsection. International trade theory, with its own variants, will provide a coherent
framework within which to make the case for the free movement of people within a
system of international intellectual property.

1. NationalSecurity
Restrictions on the movement of people internationally have often, especially in
the contemporary global climate, been justified on grounds of national security. The
argument, stated broadly, is that individuals who may pose a danger to the security
of people and the state must be identified as they cross national borders. 112 This
argument supports close scrutiny at the border and in the granting of permission for
entry into a country. 113 Restrictions on the movements of people and of information
are closely linked under this broad umbrella of national security. 114 Individuals can
pose a danger to the nation and its peoples by either bringing in weapons and plans
for mass destruction or by taking out information that may be instrumental for the
execution of such plans. 115 Consequently, curtailments of the movement of people
and information, especially when information is embodied in people, are necessary
116
for the protection of the state.
National security concerns cast some doubt whether the arguments in favor of
high velocity labor markets in certain select regions generalize to the global market
for labor. 117 If one accepts that cross-border movement of labor poses potential
national security concerns, then one would tolerate legal restrictions on the
movement of labor, whether in the form of contractual restrictions or from statutory
112 See Kevin Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After
September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1377-80
(2007) (presenting national security based arguments defending restrictions on the movement of
people); see also Donald Kerwin & Margaret D. Stock, The Role of Immigration in a Coordinated
National Security Poicy, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383, 389 (2007) (outlining immigration law and
policy that incorporates national security concerns).
113 See Kerwin & Stock, supra note 112, at 401 (suggesting national identification numbers
with biometric identifiers for all U.S. citizens as one option).
114 See generallyid.(discussing immigration as a national security issue).
115 See Johnson & Trujillo, supra note 112, at 1395-96 (indicating that undocumented
"invisible" immigrants pose a special threat to national security).
116 See id.
117Compare SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18, at 325-26 (stating the
advantages of open employment and failing to mention any security concerns), with Johnson &

Trujillo, supra note 112, at 1395-96 (indicating that undocumented "invisible" immigrants pose a
special threat to national security).
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restrictions, such as from trade secret or other forms of regulation. 118 These concerns
are reconcilable with each of the rationales in favor of high velocity labor markets
presented by Professors Saxenian, Hyde, and Gilson, respectively. 119 According to
Professor Saxenian, high velocity labor markets reflect a market of openness and
freedom of movement. 120 However, national security threats cast a shadow on this
open culture as bad actors may readily mix with benevolent ones. 121 Professor Hyde's
economic justification for high velocity labor markets rests on the ability of mobile
labor to disseminate know-how throughout an industry. 122
National security
arguments imply that this know-how may be placed to destructive as well as
constructive ends, and therefore restrictions on labor mobility may be necessary to
sort out the good uses of know-how from the bad. 123 Finally, Professor Gilson
supports high velocity labor markets because of the presence of spill-overs across
firms that permit cross-fertilization, which spurs innovation. 24 But the national
security concerns suggest that knowledge spill-overs can be destructive as well as
constructive and therefore limitations on labor mobility may be necessary to ensure
that only positive spillovers result from labor mobility. 125
While national security concerns can readily be accommodated into the
traditional arguments in favor of high velocity labor markets, these concerns may
prove too much. 126 There is no reason, first of all, why these concerns are limited to
cross-border movements of labor. 127 Not only can terrorists be home-grown, but the
know-how garnered from an employment relationship can also be fashioned for
domestic criminal activities. 128 Computer programming skills can translate into

118 See Kerwin & Stock, supra note 112, at 423-25.
119See generallyHYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17 (analyzing "high-velocity
labor markets" and their advantages); SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18 (indicating
that work force mobility has aided the rapid growth of many worldwide regional economies); Gilson,
supra note 15 (comparing and contrasting Silicon Valley and the Route 128 Corridor).
120 See SAXENIAN SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 29-57 (describing the
growth of Silicon Valley).
121 See Johnson & Trujillo, supra note 112, at 1396-98 (indicating that conservative pundits in
2005 were calling for the complete closing of the United States border to protect against the threat
of terrorism).
122 See Hyde, The Wealth of Shared Information, supra note 15 (discussing the paradoxes
involved in knowledge sharing while promoting the practice).
123 See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, The Pubhe-PrivateSecurity Partnership: Counterterrorism
Considerations for Employers in a Post-9/11 World, 2 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 427, 427-28 (2006)
(indicating that the public and private sector must work together to prevent terrorism).
124 Gilson, supra note 15, at 585-86.
125 See Morriss, supra note 123, at 430 (suggesting that immigration policy changes in the
2000's will cause strain in the private sector).
126 See generallyMichael A. Olivas, The War on Terrorism Touches the Ivory Tower-Colleges
and Universities After 9/11: An Introduction, 30 J.C. & U.L. 233 (2004) (summarizing national
security arguments restricting movement of people and of information in academia).
127 See Jo Thomas, MeVeigh Found Guilty of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1997, § 4, at 42.
128 See JOSEPH LIEBERMAN & SUSAN COLLINS, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. &
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, THE INTERNET, AND THE HOMEGROWN
TERRORIST THREAT 2-3 (2008), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/-files/IslamistReport.pdf
(discussing the growing threat of homegrown terrorism).
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hacking. 129 Knowledge acquired in a high technology firm can be targeted towards
electronic theft or to identity theft.130 If limitations on labor are necessary to prevent
movement of the nefarious across national borders, then similar justifications would
support restrictions across state or regional lines.' 3' Stated more broadly, the
national security arguments simply identify the bad ends to which information can
be put when placed in the wrong hands. 132 Certainly labor mobility can facilitate
such bad uses, but criminal law more narrowly targeting national security breaches,
rather than labor restrictions, may be the more appropriate response both at the
national and at regional levels.
The problem with criminal laws that target harmful uses of information is that
they unavoidably impede the movement of labor. 133 Since the harmful uses of
information are embodied in persons, attempts to target the harmful uses of
information will affect how readily labor is willing to move. 134 Spot checks on the
work habits of employees or extensive background checks, to take two examples,
raise the costs of the employment relationship and harm the ease with which
workers can move across firms as well as their productivity and loyalty within the
firm. 1 35 Once security concerns are recognized, then the path to paranoia has been
blazed, and legal regimes need to be carefully constructed in order to capture the
allegedly bad actors without tainting more productive relationships that are based on
trust and a sense of loyalty to the team. 136 In the vision of the world painted by
Professors Saxenian, Hyde, and Gilson, employers and employees understand the
rules of the game that support the ease of labor mobility. 137 The start-up culture
reflects, ideally, the trust in a system of mobile people and mobile ideas that support
growth and industrial development.
129 See, e.g., Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium, 80 OR. L. REV.
1423, 1440 (2001) (giving tips to prevent hackers from obtaining personal information off one's
computer via the internet).
130 See, e.g., id. at 1426 (describing various ways identify theft occurs, both through high and
low tech means).
131 See Thomas, supra note 127.
132 See, e.g., Elisa D. Harris, The Killers in the Lab, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at A21
(discussing how the buildup of research after the 2001 anthrax scare may actually be causing more
problems than it has solved).
133 See Moohr, supra note 20, at 909-10 (discussing how the Economic Espionage Act may
restrain employee mobility).
134 But see Hyde, The Wealth of SharedInformation, supra note 15 (follow "Legal Impediments
to Endogenous Growth" hyperlink) (discussing how non-compete covenants and trade secrets law
have hindered employee mobility).
135 See Robert Rector, Reducing Illegal Immigration Through Employment Verifcation,
Enforcement and Protection, HERITAGE FOUND., Oct. 7, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/researcI/
immigration/bg2192.cfm (noting that if every employer used E-Verify, an available background
check program available through the Department of Homeland Security, the cost to employers
would be upwards of $600 million per year).
136 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 132 (indicating that the community working on anthrax had
grown to 7,200 by Aug. 12, 2008, and that the community is now too large for everyone to know each

other).
137 See, e.g., SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note
acceptability of mobility among Silicon Valley engineers); Gilson
Valley firms' ability to "prevent knowledge spillovers through
Wealth of Shared Information, supra note 15 (analyzing Silicon
laws affecting that mobility).

15, at 34 (mentioning the social
supra note 15 (discussing Silicon
employee mobility."); Hyde, The
Valley's work force mobility and
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In theory, it is possible through legal institutions to create a wall of separation
between the culture of high velocity labor markets and the fears of national security
threats. Copyright and patent laws recognize this separation in its goal of promoting
progress in science and the useful arts. Each body of laws creates a system of
property rights that protect works that meet some minimal standard of creativity
and invention that supports the promotion of progress. 138 However, neither copyright
nor patent scrutinizes closely the effect a legally protected work has on the promotion
of progress. Copyright protects a book that may be full of lies and falsehoods, as long
as the book is original and fixed in a tangible medium. 139 In truth, copyright may
offer more legal protection for a book of lies than a book of facts even though the
former may detract from progress. 140 Similarly, patent law protects an invention
that may harm the environment or persons as long as the invention is patentable
subject matter, useful, novel, non-obvious, and enabled 4 1
In each case, the
problematic work can be cured either through the marketplace of ideas and products
or, more realistically, through independent laws that protect against defamation or
combat harms to safety, health, and welfare. 142 Copyright and patent law, if
designed effectively, ensure that new works and inventions can be created and
possibly be brought to the public for use and scrutiny. 143
Similarly, separate rules and legal regimes can ensure the benefits of high
velocity labor markets and the policing of the harmful use by persons of useful
information. The danger is blurring the separate aims and means of these two bodies
of law. As I argue below, the Economic Espionage Act in practice does pose the
danger of blurring these two different areas of law with the result of limiting the
beneficial movement of people and information. Policing the movement of people and
information poses a challenge that does not exist for copyright and patent. In the
latter two areas of intellectual property, the law can permit the work or invention to

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 101-03 (2006).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see, e.g., Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1973) ("There
is nothing in the Copyright Act to suggest that the courts are to pass upon the truth or falsity, the
138

139

soundness or unsoundness, of the views embodied in a copyrighted work.").
140 See Fesit Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991) ("That there can
be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood."). Compare Belcher, 486 F.2d at 1088
(granting copyright protection to a work consisting of fraudulent misrepresentations), with Hoehling
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding plaintiffs historical
interpretation of the Hindenburg tragedy not copyrightable).
141 See, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding a patent for a juice mixer with display reservoir valid despite the misrepresentation that
the juice received was dispensed from the reservoir). But see Margo A. Bagley, Patent First,Ask
Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 479-80
(2003) (arguing for limitations on patents for inventions that may pose moral or ethical dilemmas).
142 E.g. David L. Ulin, Why PayMilhons for A Milion's'Lies L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at 5
(discussing facts surrounding the $2.35 million settlement, paid out in refunds to consumers,
between author and publisher after journalists exposed author's "memoir" as falsified); University
Gives Up Patent on Sick Dogs, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2004, at B7 (reporting that University of Texas
gave up patent covering dogs made ill with radiation amid protests and pending patent
reexamination).

143

See generally Michael L. Goldman & Alice Y. Choi, The New Optional Inter Partes

Reexamination Procedure and Its Strategic Use, 28 AIPLA Q.J. 307 (discussing the benefits and
strategies of reexamination options for patents).
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be created while restricting their uses. 144 As a practical matter, the use of
information will always be embodied in persons and therefore policing criminal uses
of information will have some effect on the movement of persons. As I suggest below,
the law must be carefully crafted and applied so as not to interfere with the benefits
of high velocity labor markets.
In short, while national security arguments need to be considered in assessing
the ease of mobility of persons and information, they do not counter the benefits of
high velocity labor markets and do not by themselves prevent the generalization of
the traditional arguments to the international movement of labor.

2. Economies of Scale
The concept of economies of scale refers to the benefits that are gained by
operating a firm at an increased level of production. 145 A manufacturing plant, for
example, may be able to produce on average a million units of a product more cheaply
than a thousand. 146 A university may benefit, to a point, from having a large faculty
and student body rather than a small one. 147 The extent of economies of scale depend
on a number of factors such as the technology, the size of the marketplace for the
product or service being produced, geographic factors like the costs of transportation,
148
and the ease with which information and knowledge can be communicated.
Arguments from Professors Saxenian, Hyde, and Gilson rest in many ways on
49
regional or local economies and therefore do not generalize to national markets. 1
Professor Saxenian's cultural arguments rest on the specific attitudes to
openness and mobility that characterize high technology labor markets.1 50 She does
suggest in recent work that such attitudes also inform the international migration of
workers, especially from India.151 Economic factors may militate against extending
the cultural analysis to global labor markets. 152 Professor Hyde's defense of high
velocity labor markets and the free movement of persons rests on the movement of
144 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A (identifying the scope and rights attributed to a copyrighted

work); 35 U.S.C.

§ 271 (defining a negative right conferred by patent law).

145 See ALFRED D. CHANDLER,

JR.,

SCALE AND SCOPE:

THE DYNAMICS

OF INDUSTRIAL

CAPITALISM 17 (1990) ("Economies of scale may be defined initially as those that result when the

increased size of a single operating unit producing or distributing [a higher volume of] a single
product reduces the unit cost of production or distribution.").
146 See id. at 21-28 (explaining the changing supply/demand relationships in different
industries as improvements in technology make processes and production more efficient).
147 See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, AMERICA'S BEST COLLEGES, 2010 EDITION 83-124 (Peter
Meredith ed. 2009) (ranking America's best colleges and universities, partially based on faculty and
student body size).
148 See CHANDLER, supranote 145, at 21-28 (detailing factors that lead to economies of scale).
149 See generally HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17 (chronicling the
development of Silicon Valley); SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15 (comparing the
culture and completion in Silicon Valley with the Route 128 area); Gilson, supra note 15 (analyzing

the application of non-compete clauses in Silicon Valley and the Route 118 area).
150 SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 133 (describing the way that pioneer
companies in Silicon Valley formalized the process of collective learning and the way that companies
in the Route 128 area struggled to embrace a more dynamic labor market).
151SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18, at 307-14.
152 DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 146-49.
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information between firms within an industry that supports the free mobility of
labor. 15 3 Professor Gilson focuses on the spillovers that are created by the movement
of information and labor that facilitates innovation and the creation of new ideas. 154
However, these positive benefits of mobility are largely local.1 55 It is not clear that
these benefits would be realized at the national level as labor moves across national
borders. 15 6 For example, if the positive benefits that Professors Hyde and Gilson
identify do extend to national markets, why do we not notice more migration between
regions like Silicon Valley and Route 128? The costs of movement could be one
explanation. Workers and firms in the Route 128 region may not be able to uproot
easily to take advantage of the benefits in Silicon Valley. 157 While costs are certainly
an important explanation for the lack of mobility across these regions, a lack of
within country mobility may indicate the localized nature of the benefits from high
velocity labor markets. 158
Scale effects at the national level would also outweigh the spillover benefits that
arise from the free flow of information across firms. 159 Professor Gilson recognizes
that the mobility of labor within Silicon Valley creates a start-up culture that
supports an industry based on many small firms, each developing technologies that
may make it big. 160 Some companies, like Genentech or Cisco, do expand to take
advantage of the economies of scale. 161 But high velocity labor markets create a
regional industrial structure that consists of many small firms with some winners
that are able to recognize scale economies and take all. 162 This industrial structure
may not work at the national level where a national industry would require large
companies that realize scale economies at the national and international levels. 163
Firms seeking to realize these scale economies would want to place limitations on
labor mobility in order to increase firm size.164 These limitations would translate
into some restrictions on the ability of employees to leave the firm and form start-ups
either within the country or in another country. 165
Consequently, regional
advantages from high velocity labor markets do not necessarily map onto national
153Hyde, The Wealth of Shared Information, supra note 15 (identifying the culture in Silicon
Valley regarding the enforcement of non-compete clauses and the theft of trade secretes as a major
reason for the success of many businesses in Silicon Valley).
154Gilson, supra note 15, at 594-600.
155Id. at 586-94 (focusing his analysis on Silicon Valley and the Route 128 area).
156 See id.
157 See SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 106-11 (documenting Silicon
Valley's superior economic recovery over that of the Route 128 area in the 1980's).
158See id.
159 See CHANDLER, supranote 145, at 21-28.
160 Gilson, supra note 15, at 594-601.
161 See CHANDLER, supra note 145 at 58-59 (explaining how economies of scale lead to
innovation).
162 See id. at 594-97 (explaining role of economies of scale in organizations and the advantage
of gaining economies of scale for a firm).
163 See id. at 298-306 (exploring the creation of international organizations in the oil and
rubber industries).
164 See generallyBEN-ATAR, supra note 33 (discussing the legal limitations on the emigration
of skilled labor to promote industrial development in England).
165 See, e.g., SAXENAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 115-17 (indicating that the
Silicon Valley organization model works for the computer industry and partially led to the downfall
of Route 128 as a frontrunner in computer production).
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advantages and restrictions on labor mobility at the national level may be so
justified.
The presence of scale economies offers a more compelling argument for
restrictions on labor than national security. 166 But two caveats are worth noting.
First, restrictions on labor mobility do not necessarily translate into restrictions on
immigration.167 National firms can expand just as readily from the hiring of nondomestic labor which would mandate fairly liberal immigration possibilities. Scale
economies would support restrictions on the emigration of labor, particularly
emigration that results in the creation of new firms. 168 The difficulty is that policies
that limit the exit of labor may indirectly affect entry as employees may be unwilling
to accept employment terms that too drastically raise the costs of exit.169
Nonetheless, the realization of scale economies is consistent with open border policies
as long as there are appropriate restrictions on the outflow of people and
170
information.
Second, regional economies often also take advantage of the immigration of labor
across national borders. 171 As pointed out above, the lack of mobility of labor from
Route 128 to Silicon Valley raises some questions about the benefits of high velocity
labor markets at the national level. Costs of migration may explain this lack of
mobility.172 However, the immigration of non-United States nationals into Silicon
Valley belies the argument that the benefits are solely regional. 173 Professors
Saxenian and Hyde have both studied the increase of highly skilled immigrants
entering the United States under the H-1B visa program in the 1990's.174 For
Professor Hyde, this movement of people is somewhat of a mystery as he documents
the costs of the program to the workers themselves. 175 Separation from family,
restrictions on long-term employment, and questionable employment practices are
examples of these costs. 176 Professor Saxenian, however, describes high skilled
166 See CHANDLER, supra note 145, at 21-28 (describing the cost savings of mass production
compared to a lower production levels).
167 See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding the
temporary injunction against an employee's movement to another company, and the permanent
injunction against that employee divulging the previous employer's trade secrets, but not restricting
immigration in any way).
168 See SAXENAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18, at 78-81 (discussing of start-ups by
immigrant entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley).
169 See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2006) (setting maximum sentences for individuals convicted under
this section at $500,000 and/or fifteen years in prison per offense).
170 See DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 146-49 (mathematically summarizing labor
migration).
171 Eg, HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17, at 125-39 (illustrating Silicon
Valley's use, and arguably abuse, of the United States H- 1B visa system).
172 See Donna Rosato, The Real Cost of Relocating, CNN MONEY.COM, Sept. 24, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/09/19/pf/100400146.moneymag/index.htm (discussing relocation costs in
general).
173 See SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18, at 274-324 (illustrating how India
firms have taken advantage relationships with Silicon Valley firms).
174 HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17, at 125-39; SAXENIAN, THE NEW
ARGONAUTS, supra note 18, at 48-81 (focusing on immigrant work force statistics).
175 See HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17 at 132 ("H- 1B visas bind workers to
employers, often for six years, while imposing no reciprocal obligations on the employers.").
176 Id. at 132-33.
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immigrant labor as the "new argonauts," who exemplify an entrepreneurial spirit
that is willing to bear these costs in order to recognize substantial benefits that high
velocity labor markets provide. 177 Her cultural explanation may also have an
economic dimension. 178 Given the labor market conditions in countries like India,
Silicon Valley, even with the attendant costs of movement across seas, may offer
attractive benefits. 179 The irony is that it may make more economic sense for
someone to move across global borders to recognize these opportunities than for
someone to move within the country. 8 0 The counterintuitiveness of this outcome can
be appreciated in light of the local social and professional network that someone in
Route 128 may have that would be costly to sever by a move to Silicon Valley. 181 A
highly skilled worker from outside the US may not bear these costs and also gains
the advantage of developing skills and know-how from work overseas.182 The larger
point is that the spillover benefits from high velocity labor markets may not simply
be regional. Cross-country differences in labor and market opportunities may in part
account for the movement of people and information across national borders to
8 3
capture these benefits.
Scale economies at the national level are a possible limitation of extending
arguments in favor of high velocity labor markets to the movement of people and
information across national borders.18 4 But the existence of scale economies does not
in itself negate these traditional arguments.18 5 Instead, they call attention to the
issues of international trade and cross-country differences in economic conditions
that the consideration of international trade theory will aid in making more
systematic and robust in making the case for the movement of people and
86
information globally. 1

177See SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18, at 80 ("Silicon Valley's skilled
immigrants have been quick to catch the entrepreneurial bug.").
178 Id. ("These [business with CEOs having Chinese, Indian, or Korean surnames in Dunn &
Bradstreet's database of technology firms started since 1980] collectively accounted for over
$25 billion in sales and close to 100,000 jobs.").
179Id. at 84-85 (indicating that a number of these "new argonauts" start up their own
companies in their promising homelands after first coming to the Silicon Valley but other "new
argonauts" with less promising opportunities in their homelands plan to stay in Silicon Valley).
180 See id. at 274-324 (illustrating several reasons why India has become a hub for information
technologies industries).
181 SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 59-82 (comparing the culture of the

Route 128 Corridor the the culture of Silicon Valley).
182 See SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18, at 82-84 (documenting network

benefits for Israeli, Chinese, Taiwanese, and Indian immigrants in Silicon Valley and identifying

cross-regional communities).
183 See KRUGMAN, supra note 45, at 33-34. Paul Krugman analyzes the realization of scale
economies that arises from labor pooling in a region. Id. Concentration of labor can have both
regional and national benefits. Id.
184 See, SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 156-57 (indicating that the close

geographic proximity in Silicon Valley allows firms to monitor and adapt to new and changing
technological innovations creating a scale economy based on knowledge and innovation).
185 See id.
186 See id.
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3. Normative Foundations ofIntellectualProperty
Traditional arguments in favor of high velocity labor markets implicitly assume
that wealth maximization is the normative criterion for gauging policy.18 7 Rules and
norms favoring labor mobility in Silicon Valley support the creation of wealth and
promote economic growth. 188 One controversy is whether this normative goal is
assessed regionally or nationally. 8 9 After all if free labor mobility is desirable, the
natural question is why other regions have not followed the Silicon Valley model for
high technology industries. 190 Seemingly, Professors Saxenian, Hyde, and Gilson
present positive rather than normative analyses of these labor markets. 191 But
generalizing their arguments to cross-border movement of labor forces us to address
the normative question of whether permitting the free movement of persons is
normatively desirable. 192 When assessing this question at the international level,
one is forced to confront the question of whether the individual nation-state is the
correct unit of analysis or whether the normative inquiry should adopt a global
focus. 193 Generalizing the traditional arguments in favor of high velocity labor
markets to the international movement of labor may be difficult precisely because the
normative foundation of international intellectual property law (and arguably
immigration policy) is the maximization of the welfare of an individual nation-state.
It should be stressed that this normative foundation does not countenance
jingoistic or xenophobic values in assessing policy. The argument here is that the
citizens of Country A need not consider the welfare of Country B in designing its
legal system, and vice versa. To the extent that Country A adopts a legal system out
of animus towards Country B, or out of an intent to harm Country B for racist or
nativist reasons, such policies should be discounted. Legitimate arguments, however,
for considering only the nation-state in designing policy is that an individual country
cannot and should not affect outcomes outside its borders. Therefore, the citizens of
each country need only consider the implications of a course of policy within its own
borders.

187See, e.g., Hyde, The Wealth of Shared Information, supra note 15 (making an assumption
that "socially optimal results in markets for information" are sought).
188HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17, at 32-40.
189See Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1043-45 (2001)
(summarizing the debate between nationalism and cosmopolitanism); Seyla Benhabib, The Law of
Peoples, Distributive Justice, and Migrations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1763 (2004) (same). As
the analysis of this section shows, I myself am informed by a cosmopolitan view of intellectual
property rights and in general the cosmopolitanism endorsed by Kwame Anthony Appiah. See
KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS 155-56 (2006).
190See, e.g., SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 59-82 (describing the
organizational structure of companies along Route 128).
191See Gilson, supra note 15, at 613-19 (touting the legal advantages of California's labor
laws). See generallyHYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, supra note 17 (explaining the advantages
of Silicon Valley's mobile work force); SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18 (touting the
advantages of work force movement within and between regional labor markets).
192See, e.g., DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 146-49 (analyzing the movement of labor
forces across borders).
193See CHANDLER, supra note 145, at 1043-45 (summarizing the debate between nationalism
and cosmopolitanism).
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Concepts of sovereignty and comity are consistent with this normative
criterion. 194 Furthermore, adopting the nation-state as the unit of analysis could be
consistent with either a realist or idealist conception of international law. 195 A
realist would see the nation-state centered approach as the basis for a rational actor
model of international relations. 196 An idealist, on the other hand, would see the
state centered approach as respecting aspects of individual autonomy and
governance, either based on cultural values or the history of particular nationstates. 197
Applying these criteria to intellectual property policy, a nation-state is allowed
to design intellectual property laws and institutions that maximize its own welfare
without consideration of benefits that accrue to other nations. 198 To the extent that
individual state decision making results in either positive or negative spillovers to
other countries, international institutions, such as treaties or organizations for global
governance, may arise to assuage these external effects. 199 Within this normative
frame, a nation-state would be allowed to limit mobility of labor across countries in
order to contain information or knowledge within a country for the benefit of its own
economy even if there may be positive spillovers that result from the movement of
people and information across borders. Therefore, the traditional arguments for high
velocity labor markets do not necessarily generalize to the international level.
The nation-state-centered perspective is consistent with the current design of
international intellectual property institutions. The World Trade Organization and
its Trade Related Intellectual Property Systems ("TRIPS") Agreement assumes that
the nation-state is the appropriate actor. 200 The Agreement imposes substantive
minima on how each nation-state that is a signatory to the agreement must design
its intellectual property laws in order to comply with the Agreement, or otherwise
201
face the possibility of a dispute resolution process and attendant sanctions.
Furthermore, the Agreement permits certain classes of nation-states (e.g. developing
countries) to establish timelines for meeting its treaty obligations. 202 Underscoring
the nation-state-centered perspective is the history leading up to the ratification of
TRIPS, which rested on the concerns of the developed countries that developing
countries were "free-riding" on the intellectual property and innovation flowing from
the developed countries. 203 The Agreement was designed to make countries
coordinate on a system of intellectual property rights that would facilitate the free
194 See, e.g., Ken I. Kersch, The Supreme Courtand InternationalRelations Theory, 69 ALB. L.
REV. 771, 777-83, 790-93 (2006).
195

Id.

196

Id. at 777-83.

197 Id. at 790-93.
198 Id.

199 See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement],

available at http://www.wto.int/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-TRIPS.pdf.
200 See TRIPS Agreement art. 1.
201

Id.

Id. art. 65.
See id. at pmbl. ("Recognizing also the special needs of the least-developed country
Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations
in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base [.]") (emphasis in original).
202
203
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flow of goods and services across borders without the fear of misappropriation of
technology and information in countries with little or no intellectual property
protection. 20 4 When understood in this way, not only does the TRIPS Agreement
support a nation-state-centered view of intellectual property policy and law making,
but it also supports limitations on the movement of people that could facilitate the
types of misappropriation of information that the original proponents of TRIPS were
attempting to prevent.
Although the nation-state-centered argument is a prevalent one that needs to be
taken seriously and does pose a potential impediment to supporting high velocity
labor markets at the international level, there are several reasons to be skeptical of
basing intellectual property policy solely on the welfare effects on the nation-state.
20 5
First, a nation-state-centered approach runs the risk of policy myopia.
Benefits that seem to be leaking from one nation-state to another may in fact inure
back to the source country. 206 Therefore, ignoring spillover effects in designing
national intellectual property law may lead to poor policy choices. 20 7 For example,
allowing skilled labor to leave a nation-state may in fact impose benefits on the
country to which the skilled labor emigrates. 20 8 But the benefits may inure back to
the originating country in the form of remittances or increased trade with the
receiving country. 20 9 South Asian 6migr6s to the United States have returned to
South Asia, particularly India, to help develop Indian industry, which in turn benefit
the United States culturally (food, movies, medical services, software, books).210
Conceptually, a spillover may have no recognizable boundaries whether that of a
firm, an industry, or a nation-state. 211 While it may be unrealistic for the
policymakers of a nation-state to be cosmopolitan in considering benefits to all other
nation-states in the design policy, a narrow focus on the interests of one's own nationstate solely may often ignore the benefits of spillovers to the detriment of domestic
212
policy making.
Second, a nation-state-centered focus on international intellectual property
policy ignores history. 2 13 It is well documented that the United States free-rode on

204 See MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 67-69 (Brookings Inst. Press 1998) (describing business motivations

and mobilization in implementing the TRIPS agreement).
205 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 271-84
(2007) (identifying benefits of spillovers).
206

Id.

Id.; see also W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at
92-99. (discussing the economics of spillovers and the role of positive externalities in markets).
208 Frischmann & Lemley, supranote 205, at 271-84.
207

209 See SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18, at 274-324 (chronicling the growth of
IT business in India).
210 Id.; see also James E. Rauch, Business and Social Networks in InternationalTrade, 39 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1177, 1184-90 (2001) (identifying the benefits that arise from social and
business networks in the global context).
211 Frischmann & Lemley, supranote 205, at 271-84.
212 Id.

213 Id. (illustrating that the spillover of intellectual property has in the past and continues in
the future to provide a platform for innovation and technological development, and impeding that

spillover will negatively disrupt the historical pace of technological achievement).
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industrial and cultural innovation in Europe during the Nineteenth Century.214
Manufacturing secrets made their way across the Atlantic in the acquired know-how
of workers or even what would be described as industrial spies. 215 Pirated editions of
novels stocked the shelves of United States publishers, serving as disseminators of
culture in the form of cheap books. 216 Even within Europe, political and legal battles
were waged over the scope and substance of patent and copyright laws, and
industries and regions benefited from differential and lax intellectual property
laws. 217 Whether economic development and prosperity would have been stronger
and faster with more uniform and robust intellectual property protection seems to
ignore the fact that industrial development and prosperity did occur despite a cookie cutter model of intellectual property. 218 The movement of people and the movement
of information facilitated regional growth and fueled economic prosperity more
broadly. 219 The current model of international intellectual property that is nationstate-centered and largely homogeneous neglects the boons from the movement of
people and information across national borders.
Finally, global distributional concerns controvert a nation-state-centered system
of international intellectual property. 220 While international relations is not a "zerosum" game by any means, too strong a set of intellectual property rights in the
221
developed world may have adverse consequences on developing countries.
Economic analyses of international trade and intellectual property (to which I will
turn in the next section) suggest that uniform and strong intellectual property rights
across countries benefit innovator countries at the expense of less innovative,
developing countries. 222 Strong intellectual property rights may in the long run spur
innovation in developing nations, the short and medium run effects may be to worsen
unequal wealth and income distribution globally. 223 In many instances, it may be
unrealistic for one or even several nation-states to address global concerns through
domestic intellectual property systems, focusing solely on the benefits and costs to

214 See generally BEN-ATAR, supra note 33 (documenting how the United States plundered a
substantial amount of intellectual property from Europe in the colonial times).
215
See id. at 112-13.
216 See Sarah Barringer Gordon, "OurNationalHearthstone".Anti-Polygamy Fiction and the
Sentimental Campaign Against MoralDiversityin Antebellum America, 8 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 295,
307 n.43 (1996) (noting that "cheap books" were being pushed by book jobbers that were able to
travel by rail across America to sell their product); see also Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 440-44 (2003) (discussing copyright issues facing book trade in the
United States).
217 See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 321-22 (MIT Press 2004).
218 Id. (showing that development still occurred despite the earliest intellectual property
treaties, dating back as far as 1883).
219 See id.
220 See e.g., SCOTCHMER, supra note 217, at 322 ("As soon as the popular Harry Potter movies
were released, illicit copies were reportedly selling on the streets of Beijing, even before they had
reached most of the British and American movie houses.").
221 See id. at 326.
222 See id. at 329 (finding that countries that are more innovative prefer strong intellectual
property rights while countries with large markets do not).
223 See id. at 329-36.
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individual nation-states may worsen the global trade environment in the long run. 224
From a distributional perspective, the movement of persons and information may
facilitate the creation of a global commons that could inure to the benefit of
225
individual nation-states.

4. Summary
High velocity labor markets in Silicon Valley reflect, according to Professor
Saxenian, a culture of openness and free exchange of ideas and information that
supports innovation. 226 This culture in turn lays the foundation for an economic
structure that links the movement of labor to the movement of information and the
creation of industry spillovers, according to Professors Hyde and Gilson. 227 This
constellation of cultural, economic and legal theories explains the success of high
velocity labor markets in Silicon Valley.
This section has presented three arguments against extending the case for high
velocity labor markets to the international movement of persons. Each of these,
national security, scale economies, and normative foundations in the nation-state,
introduce compelling points in the debate, but are ultimately deficient in challenging
the case for global high velocity labor markets. These potential limitations, however,
aid in understanding how the case for the free movement of people and information
across national borders can be made persuasive. The case needs to address the
arguments in favor of cross border movement of goods, services, people, and
information. To make this case, I turn to a set of arguments that traditional
arguments for high velocity labor markets, as articulated by Professors Saxenian,
Hyde, and Gilson have largely ignored: the theory of international trade. The
arguments from international trade theory will be the focus of the next section.

C. InternationalTrade Theory and High Velocity LaborMarkets
International trade theory can aid in generalizing traditional arguments in favor
of high velocity labor markets to the movement of labor across national borders.
Traditional arguments focus exclusively on movement of persons and information
across firms within an industry in a particular region.2 2 8 In this way, the scholarship
of Saxenian, Hyde, and Gilson contributes to the literature on intellectual property
and the boundary of the firm. 2 9 Recognizing intellectual property as immigration
224 See SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18, at 82-84 (indicating that India, China,
Taiwan, and Israel are taking advantage of the intellectual property transfer from Silicon Valley

under current intellectual property law).
225 See id.
226 Id. at 11.
227 Gilson, supra note 15, at 594-602; Hyde, The Wealth ofSharedInformation, supra note 15.
228 See, e.g., SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 29-57 (reviewing the
industry development and the free movement culture of Silicon Valley).
229 See generally SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15 (comparing and contrasting
the differences between Silicon Valley and the Route 128 Corridor in Massachusetts); Hyde, The
Wealth of Shared Information, supra note 15 (analyzing Silicon Valley's work force mobility and
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policy, through legislation like the Economic Espionage Act, asks us to explore the
2 3
relationship between intellectual property and the boundary of the nation-state. 0
International trade theory, an economic theory that addresses exchange of goods,
services, people, and information across national boundaries, aids in making the case
2 31
for high velocity labor markets globally.
The discussion in this section has implications beyond the immediate application
to the Economic Espionage Act. Since contemporary international intellectual
property law derives from the TRIPS Agreement, part of the World Trade
Organization which grew out of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
2 32
("GATT"), international trade and intellectual property are intimately connected.
But academic work has largely ignored the implications of the economic theory of
international trade for intellectual property systems.2 33 While there is a very rich
literature on global public goods and development,2 34 there has not been a systematic
treatment of what the positive and normative theories of international trade has to
say for intellectual property law and institutions, except for the work of Professor
Suzanne Scotchmer.2 35
Professor Scotchmer's work offers important analytical
models of how domestic intellectual property protection combined with global
intellectual property rules shapes within country and global innovation. 236 One
dimension missing from her work, however, is the role of labor mobility. My analysis
here attempts to address that overlooked issue. More broadly, this paper is intended
as a contribution to that inquiry, with the Economic Espionage Act an important and
challenging case study.
International trade theory is one of the oldest branches of economic theory with
roots in the political theory of mercantilism that recognized trade among nations,
particularly one controlled by a sovereign, as critical source of the wealth of
nations. 237 For the purposes of analysis, I divide international trade theory into two
types, neoclassical, or traditional, trade theory and contemporary trade theories.
Neoclassical trade theory accepts the nation-state as given and derives from the
existence of a nation-state as the unit of analysis a positive theory of what goods and
services one nation trades with another.2 38 The positive theory is the basis for a
normative theory, based on the principle of global wealth maximization, which is
laws affecting that mobility); Gilson, supra note 15 (comparing the laws applicable to Silicon Valley
with those applicable to the Route 128 Corridor).
230 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2006).
231 See generallyKenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al., Economic Analysis ofLabor and Employment
Law in the New Economy: Proceedings of the 2008 Annual Meeting,Association of American Law
Schools, Section on Law and Economics, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 327 (2008) (analyzing
immigration and labor in the U.S. and elsewhere).

See TRIPS Agreement pmbl.
See generally DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45 (analyzing international trade, identifying
tariffs, but not intellectual property rights, as a variable in some of his models).
232

233
234

See e.g., SAXENiAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18 (analyzing the worldwide

development of multiple facets of the information technology industry).
235 See generally SCOTCHMER, supra note 217 (analyzing international trade and intellectual
property law from a normative perspective).
236 See generally id
(discussing innovation derived from domestic and global intellectual
property).
237 Jeffrey Simser, GATS and FinancialServices: Rede'fining Borders, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 33,

41-43 (1996).
238

See DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 26-28.

[9:24 2009]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

used to assess policies that affect the flow of trade across nations, such as tariffs or
restrictions on the movement of labor. 239 This normative theory can assess the
effects of trade policy on global wealth maximization and the distribution of wealth
among and within nations.2 40 Contemporary trade theories break with many of the
assumptions of traditional theory such as perfect competition or the lack of scale
economies. 2 41 More fundamentally, contemporary trade theories do not take nationstates as given and addresses the question of how the boundaries of nation-states
and regions are formed from an economic perspective.2 42 Most provocatively for our
purposes, contemporary trade theories explore the movement of labor and
information across borders either across firms or within the boundaries of a
multinational firm.2 43 Both types of theories are useful for the policy analysis of this
Article, and each highlight distinct aspects of the relationship between international
2 44
trade and global intellectual property.
Before I present these two theories in more detail, I would like to place the
following discussion of economic theories and models in perspective of the legal and
policy analysis of this paper. Economic theories and models are abstractions that aid
in formulating a particular problem. 2 45 These abstractions are helpful to the extent
they aid in identifying and isolating the key elements of a problem.2 46 By distilling a
complex problem into some elements, obviously much is lost in terms of realism, but
much can be gained in understanding the strengths and weakness of an argument. 247
Intellectual property law, especially at the international level, is often based on
assumptions or theories of how the law can affect economic relationships. 2 48 The
theories presented here are a tool to aid in assessing the strength of these arguments
often made in support of particular intellectual property systems. It is in this spirit
that the following discussion should be understood: using established theories in
order to analyze the rhetorical and logical structure of legal arguments.

1. NeoclassicalTrade Theory
The fundamental concept in trade theory is that of comparative advantage,
which refers to those goods or services a nation-state has a relative advantage in
producing in comparison to other countries. 2 49 Trade theory predicts that in a free
trade environment, one characterized by the unfettered movement of goods and
services across borders, a country will export those goods and services in which it has

Id. at 168-75.
See, e.g., id. at 80-88 (describing the "International Equilibrium").
241 See id.at 267.
242 See Simser, supra note 237, at 38-41.
243 See DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 294.
244 See id.
245 E.g., id. at 146-49 (modeling the effects of labor migration on the economy mathematically).
246 See id.
247 Id.
248 See generally TRIPS Agreement (assuming that the nations entered into the agreement for
their own benefit).
239
240

249

DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 2-5.
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a comparative advantage relative to other countries.2 50 The goal of trade theory is to
251
predict in which goods and services a country has a comparative advantage.
There are many explanations for comparative advantage.
David Ricardo
2 52
explained comparative advantage in terms of technologies for production.
According to the technological explanation, a country has a comparative advantage in
goods that it can produce more cheaply than other countries. 253 Other theories focus
on differences in preferences or location as sources of comparative advantage.2 5 4 The
workhorse theory of comparative advantage is the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
2 55
Theory that explained comparative advantage in terms of factors of production.
According to this theory, different countries have endowments in different factors of
production (natural resources such as oil or forests, labor, physical capital like
machinery).256 Each country can take these factors of production to produce final
goods and services. 257 A country has a comparative advantage in those goods and
services that can be produced more intensively with the factors of production with
which a country is relatively endowed.25 8 For example, if Country A has relatively
more labor (because of a bigger population) than Country B, then Country A will
have a comparative advantage in (and therefore export) goods and services that use
labor more intensively than other factors of production. If Country B has relatively
more forests than Country A, then Country B will have a comparative advantage in
(and therefore export) goods and services that use lumber more intensively than
other factors of production. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Theory has been a
workhorse theory because it provides a prediction of trade patterns that can be
compared with real world data on imports and exports to assess trade activity among
259
countries.
The Theory also provided a framework to assess trade policy. According to the
Theory, if the nation-state does not interfere with the global market, then world
prices for goods and services should equalize and global welfare can be maximized. 260
Furthermore, the free movement of goods and services across borders will result in
the equalization of payments to factors of production across nations.2 61 In other
words, the free movement of goods and services will tend to equalize wages for labor
Id.
Id. at 5-15 (using several mathematical equations to predict international trade patterns).
252 See generally DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (Cosimo,
Inc. 2006) (1817) (establishing the comparative advantage economic theory).
253 Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free Trade
Practice, Global Economics & Their GoverningPrinciplesof PoliticalEconomy, 69 UMKC L. REV.
733, 759 (2001).
254 See DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 5 (noting that the simple calculation of comparative
advantage is impecise and depends on other variables that are difficult to assess).
255 See Victor D. Norman & Anthony J. Venables, InternationalTrade, FactorMobility, and
Trade Costs, 105 ECON. J. 1488, 1489-90 (1995) (discussing Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Theory).
256 DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 85-87. See generally Paul A. Samuelson, Prices of
Factors and Goods in Genera]Equilibrium,21 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1953).
257 DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 85-87.
258 See id.
259 See id. at 86 (referring to the "well-known basic Heckscher-Ohlin model").
260 See DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 80-92.
261 See Norman & Venables, supra note 255, at 1488.
See generally Paul A. Samuelson,
International Factor Price Equalization Once Again, in READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
(R.E. Caves & H.G. Johnson, eds., 1968).
250
251
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across countries. 26 2 The Theory would predict that impediments to trade patterns,
such as through tariffs or regulations that restrict the movement of goods and
26 3
services across borders, will have predictable effects on prices and wages.
Furthermore, in some cases, there will be an equivalence between the movement of
goods and services and the movement of factors of production, such as labor, across
borders. 26 4 If Country A imposes a tariff on goods from Country B, this will have an
effect on prices and wages in both countries. The tariff will cause prices and wages to
be different in the two countries and will create an incentive for labor in the low wage
country to migrate to the high wage country. According to the Theory, a barrier to
trade on a good or service can create incentives for migration of labor across borders
26 5
in order to take advantage of wage differences.
For the purpose of this paper, the equivalence between movements of goods and
movements of labor is relevant. Intellectual property can act as a barrier to the
movement of goods across countries. Patent, copyright and trademark owners have
the legal right to prevent entry of goods that may infringe their intellectual property
right. 266 This policing of the border for infringing goods acts as a barrier to trade that
in turn prevents the equalization of prices and wages across countries.
The
implication is that the barrier to movement of goods created by intellectual property
creates an incentive for the movement of labor across borders. I do not make a
prediction here about what goods or countries are affected by this theoretical
prediction. The point is about the implications of intellectual property rights in the
context of international trade for the movement of people. Strong intellectual
property rights that police the border of a country can create conditions for the
movement of people. Put another way, within the terms of free trade (which is the
argument in support of the World Trade Organization), impediments to the
movement of goods in order to limit the dissemination of information protected by
intellectual property laws create incentives for the movement of people across
borders.
This analysis has two implications. First, situating intellectual property law
within the context of a free trade agreement forces policymakers to choose between a
commitment to strong intellectual property rights and one to free trade. The
267
importation right held by an intellectual property owner creates a barrier to trade.
Free trade advocates may choose the commitment to free trade by accepting
limitations on the rights of the intellectual property owner (such as in the case of
parallel importation or by recognizing a broad first sale doctrine). Those who choose
the commitment to intellectual property may justify the restriction on the movement
of goods as necessary for protecting the incentive to create or the right of the right
owner to determine the direction and scope of trade. Alternatively, the conflicting
commitments can be reconciled by allowing the importation right but permitting the
movement of labor, specifically skilled labor that can embody the free movement of
information across borders.

262

See DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 80-92.

263

Id. at 190-91.

See id. at 127-49.
See id. at 148-49.
266 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
267 See id.
264
2 65

[9:24 2009]

Open Borders

The equivalence between the movement of goods and the movement of labor
leads to the second implication of the analysis. The movement of information is
another dimension of the global free trade regime that neither trade theory nor the
current international intellectual property environment fully accommodates. The
26 8
TRIPS Agreement addresses trade secrets and requires countries to protect them.
At the same time, the TRIPS Agreement permits exclusions to intellectual property
in order to protect competition. 26 9 How should the movement of labor be treated
under the Agreement? Would it permit high velocity labor markets at the global
level or would such a legal arrangement be in violation? The Agreement itself is not
clear and reveals a tension not only between commitments to free trade and to
intellectual property, but between the movement of people and the movement of
270
information.
From the perspective of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Theory of international
trade, free movements of information made possible through the free movement of
labor serve to counter the effects of the trade barrier created by intellectual property
law. 271 To the extent that the movement of labor and information would realize gains
from trade that are frustrated by the importation right, then such movements are
desirable. On the other hand, the Theory recognizes distributional consequences of
such movements particularly on wages in the country receiving the labor. 272 These
distributional consequences are complex and perhaps fully unpredictable. 273 While
the Theory is helpful in isolating and identifying tensions between international
trade and intellectual property, it does not provide clears answers for a resolution.
Nonetheless, the workhorse theory is helpful in pointing out the connections between
trade, intellectual property, and the movement of people.

2. Returns to Scale and ContemporaryTrade Theories
Contemporary trade theories fill in many of the deficiencies of the HeckscherOhlin-Samuelson Theory. First among the deficiencies is the failure of factor
endowments alone to explain the pattern of trade. 274 Furthermore, much trade
between countries is of the intra-industry variety: trade between countries in the
same type of good or service. 275 The fact, for example, that countries both import and
export clothing or food or automobiles contradicts the prediction of neoclassical

TRIPS Agreement art. 39 (protection of undisclosed information).
Id. art. 40 (control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licenses).
270 See id. arts. 39-40 (intending to make international trade easier, but specifically leaving in
these barriers to the movement of people).
268

269

271

See, e.g., SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 133-59 (indicating that the

mobile work force in the Silicon Valley overcame usual barriers to growth and innovation).
272

See DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 146-49.

273

Id.

See, e.g., EDWARD E. LEAMER, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 49-50 (MIT Press 1984) (identifying limitations of factor endowment
explanation for trade).
275 See James Levinsohn & David Hummels, Product Differentiation as a Source of
Comparative Advantage 83 AM. ECON. REV. 445, 445-49 (1993) (presenting different international
trade theories along with criticisms of each).
274
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theory that countries will specialize in trade. 276 Instead, trade patterns seem more
consistent with cross-border industry structure with corporate units of multi-national
firms operating across in multiple countries engaging in intra-national as well as
international markets. 277 In addition, a comparative advantage of a country may
change over time as countries invest in specific industries or in the skill level of its
workforce. 278
Finally, international trade, like any markets, can result in
externalities, of the negative sort, such as environmental harm, 279 and of the positive
sort, such as spillovers in knowledge and know-how. 280 Contemporary trade theories
attempt to account for each of these nuances of how international trade actually
28
functions. '
Two concepts are particularly relevant from contemporary trade theories to
understanding international intellectual property and high velocity labor markets at
the global level. 28 2 The first is that of returns to scale, a concept which was
introduced above. The second is that of public goods, which is related to the concept
of spillovers. Contemporary trade theories have explored both of these concepts to
28 3
understand trade between nations.
The presence of scale economies was one argument that limited the extension of
high velocity labor markets to the cross border movement of labor. 28 4 The argument
was that industry required some restriction on the movement of labor across borders
in order to realize the advantage of scale at the national level. 28 5
However,
contemporary trade theories demonstrate the role of scale economies in explaining
trade among nations. 286 Overseas markets allow a domestic firm to realize the
28 7
benefits of scale by expanding the size of markets beyond national borders.
See id. at 445-46.
See, e.g., Amy Jocelyn Glass & Kamal Saggi, MultinationalFirmsand Technology Transfer,
104 SCANDANAVIAN J. ECON. 495, 513 (2002) (concluding that while there are two rationales as to
why a source firm may prefer FDI to exporting, the realization of these benefits is insufficient to
consider FDI to always be a more attractive option); Elhanan Helpman et al., Export Versus FDI
with Heterogeneous Firms, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 300, 315 (2004) (identifying the role of economies of
scale in explaining the choice of exporting over Foreign Direct Investment in international trade).
276

277

278 See Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains from the
Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371, 412-14 (1998) (proposing

that the U.S., by altering its immigration policies, may be able to adapt and have a more

comparative advantage in labor markets).

279 See R. Manning & J. McMillan, Public Intermediate Goods, ProductionPossibiities, and
InternationalTrade, 12 CAN. J. ECON. 243, 244 (1979).
280 Boyan Jovanovic & Rafael Rob, The Growth and Diffusion of Knowledge, 56 REV. ECON.
STuD. 569, 569-70 (1989).
281 See Manning & McMillan, supranote 279, at 251.

282

See Joseph F. Francois, Global Production and Trade: FactorMigration and Commercial

Pohey with InternationalScale Economies, 35 INrL ECON. REV. 565, 577 (1994); Jota Ishikawa,
Scale Economies in FactorSupplies, InternationalTrade, and Migration,29 CAN. J. ECON. 573, 57576 (1996).
283 See Francois, supra note 282, at 567-68, 577 (analyzing returns to scale as it relates to
international trade and noting the effects of spillover).
284 See discussion infra Section I.B.2.
285 See Francois, supra note 282, at 577.
286 Paul Krugman, New Theories of Trade Among Industrial Countries, 73 AM. ECON. REV.,
343, 343 (1983) (defining a more contemporary approach to the role of economies of scale as the
theory of intraindustry trade).
287 See Francois, supra note 282, at 567.
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Multinational companies emerge to capture these scale effects by establishing
manufacturing and distribution operations overseas.2 88 Comparative advantage may
arise because of the scale effects that emerge from expanding firms.28 9 What the
presence of scale economies calls into question is the assumption of neoclassical trade
theory that nation-states should be taken as given.2 90 In fact, much of the trade
theory that explores scale economies start with the fiction of an integrated world
economy, in other words, a marketplace without national borders.2 91 Starting from
this fiction and the concept of scale economies, theorists then explore the emergence
of trading regions and the delineation of the fictionalized integrated world into a
world of markets that are defined along geographic lines. 2 92 Much of the analysis
explains how nations emerge through the accident of history and the development of
markets and firms. 2 93 One way to understand this theoretical strand is an
2 94
exploration of the boundaries of the firm and the boundaries of nations.
The concept of public goods provides a foundation for analyzing the emergence of
global institutions and norms that coordinate relations among global actors outside
the scope of the market.2 95 As is well known in the literature, a public good is one
that is consumed in a group with the benefits spread among group members.2 96 A
public good has characteristics of being non-rival and non-excludable, sometimes
both, often times only one of these characteristics.2 97 International trade often
requires the regulation of public goods, such as the oceans or the air, so the good is
not depleted or harmed through communal usage.2 98 Property rights enforced
through formal legal mechanisms or informal norms often serve to manage public
goods, and much of the scholarly literature addresses different types of public goods,
such as education, environmental cleanliness, health, safety, and knowledge
embodied in technology or know-how, both cultural and scientific.2 99 The presence of
public goods requires coordination among nation-states, 300 but also raises questions
about the boundaries of the nation-state as benefits from activities within one nation
288 See generally Hisanobu Oshe, Investment Overseas by US. Firms Rising, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
29, 1989, at D2 (reporting that many American companies are moving manufacturing and
distributing processes overseas in order to take advantage of lower costs of performing those tasks).
289 Id.
290 Levinsohn & Hummels, supra note 275, at 446-47.
291 See Akihiro Amano, InternationalFactorMovements and the Terms of Trade, 32 CAN. J.
ECON. & POL. SCI. 510, 511 (1966).
292 See KRUGMAN, supra note 45, at 70-72 (examining what a nation is by defining what it is
not).
293 See id. (proposing that borders and tariffs of nations shape markets and trade which have
effects on firms and development).
294 See id. at 70-71.
295 See Manning & McMillan, supranote 279, at 250.
296 See John G. Head & Carl S. Shoup, Public Goods, Private Goods, and Ambiguous Goods, 79
ECON. J. 567, 567 (1969) ("In the basic literature[,] a public good has been defined to be such that it
is literally impossible for the supplier to exclude potential consumers.").
297

Id.

298 Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, Trade and TranshoundaryPollution, 85 AM. ECON.
REV. 736, 730 (1995).
299 See, e.g., id. at 717-18 (discussing pollution, or the lack of pollution as a public good).
300 See Graciela Chichilnisk, North-South Trade and the Global Environment, 84 AM. ECON.
REV. 851, 864 (1994) (noting the venture between Costa Rica and Merck and its effects on both
property rights while noting environmental challenges of similar ventures).
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spillover into other nations. 30 1 Like the related concept of scale economies, the
concept of public goods challenges assumptions about the nation-state and its
30 2
competing boundaries with those of the firm.
Within neoclassical trade theory, the movement of goods and people serve to
303
equalize prices and wages across nations in order to maximize global welfare.
Within contemporary theories, the movement of goods and people serve to realize
economies of scale as firms compete across the borders of countries to expanded
markets. 30 4 While intellectual property serves largely as a barrier to trade in
neoclassical trade theory, it serves as a way for the firm to define its boundaries by
protecting firm specific information. 305 Global intellectual property protection serves
not only to police borders, but also to allow firms to achieve the desirable scale of
production across national borders. 306 Furthermore, contemporary trade theory
recognizes that information has characteristics of a public good and can create
spillovers across firms and across national borders. 307 Therefore, global intellectual
property law serves to realize these spillovers by allowing information to disseminate
within an industry and often across borders through the transfer of technology and
the movement of people. 308 Contemporary trade theory recognizes the desirability of
the movement of labor as a means of creating spillovers and global public goods. 309
The challenge, of course, with any theory is in the details. How much movement
of labor is desirable? Can we identify when spillovers and public goods are being
generated? On these questions, the theory is silent. The details are left to be worked
out based on the facts of specific cases. Contemporary trade theory, however, is
useful in supporting the arguments for generalizing traditional arguments for high
velocity labor markets to cross border movement of people and information. In short,

301 Copeland, supra note 298, at 717 ("Because pollution crosses borders, uncoordinated
regulation of pollution at the national level does not eliminate all market failure.
302 Hyde, The Wealth of SharedInformation, supranote 15.
303 Wilfred J. Ethier, InternationalTrade and LaborMigration, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691-92
(1985) (describing the benefits of migrant laborers being generally more affordable gives not only
gives a job to those seeking a one but also allows companies to produce their goods).
304 See Oshe, supra note 288.
305 Susan Scafidi, IntellectualPropertyand CulturalProducts, 81 B.U. L. REV. 793, 796 (2001)
("[J]ntellectual property law, through modification of its authorial and temporal limitations and
creation of community-specific protections such as an 'authenticity mark,' has the potential to strike
an equitable balance between source community rights and the public interest in cultural
products.").
306 See Gene M. Grossman & Edin L.C. Lai, InternationalProtection of Intellectual Property,
94 AM. ECON. REV. 1635, 1635 (2004) (describing the Uruguay round of negotiations for the WTO
which will provide more border patrols for member countries while also indirectly recognizing the
effects of economies of scale).
307 See Paul B. Stephan III, InterdiseiphnaryApproaches to International Economic Law:

BarbariansInside the Gate:Public Choice Theory and InternationalEconomic Law, 10 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 745, 765-67 (1995) (proposing that culture is a public good worth protecting).

Culture is composed of language and art and other forms of information that has been gathered by a
society and is thus, a public good. Id.
308 See Grossman & Lai, supranote 306, at 1635-36.
309 See Merrill E. Whitney & James D. Gaisford, Economic Espionage as Strategic Trade
Policy, 29 CAN. J. ECON. S627, S629 (1996) (concluding that there are benefits to espionage from a
cost sharing perspective but it may have adverse effects on innovation).
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a foundation for open borders can be made. 310 Answering how open requires
examining particular cases such as those brought under the Economic Espionage Act.
After a summary of the analysis of this section, we turn to these particular cases in
Section II.

D. Implicationsfor Law and Policy
This section has developed the case for open borders that permit the movement
of people and of information across national boundaries. Building on the scholarly
work on high velocity labor markets in high technology regions like Silicon Valley or
Route 128, I examined three arguments against extending the case for labor mobility
across firms regionally to movement across borders. These three argumentsnational security, scale economies, and normative presumption in favor of the nationstate-identified the problems of defending open borders across nations and the
limitations of the arguments in favor of regional labor mobility. An examination of
international trade theory corrected some of the deficiencies of the argument by
addressing the complex problems posed by the global movement of goods, services,
labor, and information. Several points follow from this theoretical examination.

II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS IMMIGRATION POLICY: ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE ACT

This section offers a critical presentation of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
by first describing the key provisions of the statute. The theory developed in Section
I serves as an interpretative tool for assessing the policies underlying the Act and its
implications. Prosecutions brought under the Act serve as case studies to deeper
understand these policies and the aims of the statute. The purpose of this section is
to bring to life the theoretical discussion of high velocity labor markets in the context
of the cross border movement of people and information.

A. Overview ofthe Act
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 has been described as the first
comprehensive statute to combat corporate espionage. 311 It is also the first federal
statute that protects trade secrets, historically the domain of state courts and
legislatures. 312 Unlike state statutes and common law rules that govern trade
secrets, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 is a criminal statute that does not

310 See generally SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18 (illustrating the growth of
the information technology industry worldwide).
311 United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 201 n.17 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 142 CONG. REC. H10,461
(1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde)).

312 Id. at 196.

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

[9:24 2009]

recognize a private right of action. 313 Only the United States Attorney General is
authorized to bring civil actions for injunctions against future conduct that violates
the Act. 3 14 Passage of the Act is historic not only for making certain types of trade
secret theft a federal crime, but also for being enacted in the period after the shift in
Congress in 1994 from Democrat to Republican control when so many controversial
intellectual property statutes were passed, such as the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act, the Anticybersquatting Protection Act, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
315
and the Copyright Term Extension Act.
The Act has eight substantive provisions and one definition section. 316 The first
two provisions lay out the elements of culpable offenses and the remaining six are
remedial and procedural. 317 Section 1831 deals with economic espionage 318 while
section 1832 covers the theft of trade secret. 319 The elements of economic espionage
include the purposeful or knowing misappropriation of a trade secret for the benefit
of a foreign government, instrumentality, or agency. 320 The elements of theft of a
trade secret include the purposeful or knowing misappropriation of a trade secret for
the benefit of someone other than the trade secret owner that harms the economic
interest of the owner. 321 Both provisions also impose liability for attempt and
conspiracy. 322 Misappropriation of trade secret under each provision includes the
stealing, appropriation, or the procurement through fraud or artifice of a trade
secret. 323 Finally, trade secrets are defined broadly to include the following:
[A]ll forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical,
economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans,
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods,
techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized
324
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing

313 See, e.g., Harrison-Smith v. Bank of Am., No. 06-C-4254, 2006 WL 2355565, at "1 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 10, 2006) (dismissing the section 1831 claim because the Act does not provide for a private
right of action).
314 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a) (2006) ("The Attorney General may, in a civil action, obtain appropriate
injunctive relief against any violation of this chapter.").
315 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat 1501
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006); Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended at title 17, United States Code (2006));
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended at
title 17, United States Code); Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat.
985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1125, 1127); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS:

THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 186-87 (2002) (2001)

(describing legislative changes to increase intellectual property protection during the Nineties).
316 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39.
317 Id. §§ 1831-38.
318 Id. § 1831.
319 Id. § 1832.
320 Id. § 1831(a)(3).
321 Id. § 1832.
322 Id. §§ 1831-32.
323 Id.

324 Id. § 1839(3).
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In order for this subject matter to be protected as a trade secret, the owner must take
reasonable steps to protect the secrecy and the subject matter must have
independent economic value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable
through proper means by the public. 325 The last two elements parallel requirements
under the Uniform Trade Secret Act and the common law of trade secrets while the
scope of subject matter parallels that of the Uniform Act.326
The Act also includes remedial and jurisdictional provisions. 327 Available
remedies include criminal sentencing, forfeiture of property or profits earned by the
defendant, and injunctions against conduct illegal under the Act. 328 Federal district
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction, 329 and this jurisdiction applies
extraterritorially to acts committed overseas by citizens or permanent residents of
the United States or if acts in furtherance of the offense were committed in the
United States. 330 The Act also requires the court to ensure the confidentiality of
trade secrets that are the subject of controversy in a case. 331 Finally, given the high
profile nature of the cases, Congress required the United States Department of
Justice to pursue these actions upon review and authorization by the Attorney
General. 332 In 2002, Attorney General Aschcroft approved the continued enforcement
of the Act, but required his authorization only for claims brought under section 1831,
but not under section 1832. 333 This difference represents the potential effects of
section 1831 claims on foreign sovereigns and is an explanation for why there are so
334
few indictments under section 1831.
While described as comprehensive, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, in
essence, creates federal criminal liability for acts that constitute purposeful or
knowing appropriation of a trade secret which either benefits a foreign entity or
causes economic harm to the trade secret owner while benefiting someone who does
not own the trade secret.3 3 5 By federalizing and criminalizing theft of trade secret,
325

Id.

Compare id. (requiring that the owner of a trade secret to "take reasonable measures to
keep such information secret" and that such information "derives independent economic value" by
being kept a secret), with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005)
(same). See also Mangren Research & Dev. Corp. v. Nat'l Chem. Co., 87 F.3d 937, 942 (1996)
326

(analyzing definition of trade secret under state law).
327 18 U.S.C. §§ 1837-38.

Id. § 1834.
Id. § 1836(b).
330 See Id. § 1837.
331 Id. § 1835.
332 Policy with Regard to Bringing Charges Under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 28
C.F.R. § 0.64-5 (2009). For five years after the enactment of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, all
prosecutions brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-32 required approval by the Attorney General,
Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. See id.
333 Memorandum
of Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft (Mar. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/eea1996.pdf.
334 Carr, supra note 51, at 198 (stating all prosecuted cases were under § 1832 and not under
§ 1831); see also Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Chinese National Sentenced for Committing
Economic Espionage with the Intent to Benefit China Navy Research Center 3-4 (June 18, 2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/mengSent.pdf (reporting five indictments
under section 1831 between 2001 and 2008).
335 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a); see also United States v. Chung, No. SACR08-00024-CJC, 2009 WL
2053596, at *13 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2009) (finding criminal liability against an agent of the People's
Republic of China who misappropriated sensitive aerospace and military information).
328
329
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the Act raises many of the concerns analyzed in the policy literature on high velocity
labor markets. 336 Notice that the Act itself does not enjoin the exit of employees to
337
start new firms or competition that is created by departing employees.
Nonetheless, and as the case law discussed below shows, the Act has direct and
indirect effects on labor mobility and the start-up of new firms. 338 For instance,
stealing of a trade secret may include know-how obtained by an employee at his
339
former place of employment and used or retained potentially at the new company.
Therefore, it is worth examining how the policy justifications in support of high
velocity labor markets, and the movement of people and of information, influence our
340
understanding of the Economic Espionage Act.

B. The Act in the Context ofInternationalTrade Theory
Although the Economic Espionage Act does not specifically enjoin either the
movement of people between firms or the start-up of new companies that compete
with incumbents, 341 the Act may have a chilling effect on such movement and the
343
attendant flow of knowledge. 342 The standard for liability is on paper quite high.
The defendant must, either purposefully or knowingly, steal a trade secret that
benefits someone who is not the owner of the trade secret and, for liability under
section 1832, economically harm the trade secret owner. 344 While the standard for
civil liability under state law for misappropriation can be quite low, capturing acts
that are deemed to be a violation of business ethics, the mens rea of criminal law
345
raises the bar for liability above what exists under state law.

336 See Moohr, supra note 20, at 903-07 (discussing the impact of the Economic Espionage Act
on employee mobility and economic growth).
337 H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 7 (1996), reprintedin1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4026 ("The statute
is not intended to be used to prosecute employees who change employers or start their own
companies using general knowledge and skills developed while employed."); see also S. REP. No.
104-359, at 12-13 (1996) ("The free and unfettered flow of individuals from one job to another, the
ability of a person to start a new business based upon his or her experience and expertise, should
not be injured or chilled in any way by this legislation.").
338 See Moohr, supra note 20, at 903-07.
339 H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 7 ("It is the intent of Congress, however, to make criminal the act of
employees who leave their employment and use their knowledge about specific products or processes in order to
duplicate them or develop similar goods for themselves or a new employer in order to compete with their prior
employer.").
340 See Moohr, supra note 20, at 903-07.
341See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39.
342 See id. But see United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[It is clear that
Congress did not intend the definition of a trade secret [in the Economic Espionage Act] to be so
broad as to prohibit lawful competition such as the use of general skills or parallel development of a
similar product.") (citations omitted).
343 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-32. See, e.g., Hsu, 155 F.3d at 195.
344 See, e.g., Hsu, 155 F.3d at 195-96 (presenting the legal standard for liability).
345 Compare UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005) (defining
"misappropriation" of a trade secret in the civil law context), with 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (listing
numerous things that can each be a "misappropriation," but never using the term
"misappropriation").
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However, criminal liability also extends to attempts or conspiracies to steal
trade secrets. 346 Therefore, acts that may fall short of civil liability can still
constitute criminal misconduct if the mental state elements can be found. 347 As some
of the cases show, liability might extend under the Act to attempts by one firm to
poach another firm's employees through conversation or through enticements to
move if such potential movement of workers might entail the movement of trade
secrets. 348 Evidence in favor of the requisite mental state follows from the enticing
firm's desire to acquire the know-how or other information from the employee's
previous firm. 349 The threat of criminal sanction may very likely chill employment
35 0
discussions and negotiations that are pro-competitive and that promote innovation.
Furthermore, the Act criminalizes economic espionage which entails the theft of
trade secrets that benefit a foreign entity even if there is no proof of economic harm
to the trade secret owner. 351 This provision potentially impedes the flow of
technology and knowledge across national borders, interfering with the benefits of
352
international trade and immigration.
Although these effects are theoretically possible, empirical evidence in support of
these chilling effects is difficult to muster. It has been reported that in 2007, United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement conducted over 2,600 export
investigations involving technologies subject to export controls, resulting in 188
criminal arrests, 178 indictments, and 127 convictions. 353 A large problem is that it
is very difficult to prove the absence of a fact, and even harder to demonstrate what
would have happened absent the statute. Visa denials and other immigration events,
such as deportations, might offer some evidence of the adverse effects of the Act on
the movement of people across borders. But violations of the Economic Espionage
Act have not been a basis for denial of entry or for deportation. 35 4 In 2006, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service listed six enforcement categories for
deportation actions, none of which directly bore on claims under the Economic
Espionage Act. 355 T he difficult problem is identifying how many foreign-born

346 See,
347

e.g., Hsu,155 F.3d at 197 (discussing liability for attempt and conspiracy).

See, e.g., id.

348 See United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2000) (liability based in part on
communications between exiting employee and poaching employer); United States v. Case, Crim.
No. 3:06-CR-210-TSL-LRA, 2007 WL 1746399, at *1 (S.D. Miss. June 15, 2007) (indicating that
charges can be brought under Act against departing employees who formed their own company).
349 See, e.g., Martin, 228 F.3d at 10 (noting that a poaching employer sent exiting employee a
check for the stolen information, which Federal Bureau of Investigation subsequently recovered as
evidence in the case).
350 E.g., Case, 2007 WL 1746399, at *1 (indicting, via grand jury, several employees for
conspiracy to violate the EEA under section 1832).
351 18 U.S.C. § 1831; Hsu, 155 F.3d at 195-96.
352 See, e.g., Hsu, 155 F.3d at 193, 193 n.2 (indicating that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
issued an arrest warrant for one defendant that is in Taiwan avoiding U.S. law enforcement because
Taiwan and the U.S. do not have an extradition treaty).
353 See ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 30, at 1.
354See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS tbl. 37 (2006),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/YrBk06En.shtm (follow "Table 34"
hyperlink).
355 See id. (indicating that the six categories of immigration-related activities of the U.S.
immigration and custom enforcement investigations were financial investigations, human

[9:24 2009]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

employees may have been denied employment or other opportunities within the
United States or in United States companies overseas for fear of posing a threat of
economic espionage. 35 6 The Chronicle of Higher Education has reported how many
universities are having difficulties obtaining immigration clearance for research
scientists, even for short term visits to present a lecture or participate in a
conference. 357 Much of these problems, however, are a consequence of the heightened
security concerns after the 9/11 attacks. 358 Arguably, the fear of economic espionage
may be part and parcel of the broader security concerns and resulting paranoia, and
therefore impossible to separate. 35 9 However, the experiences reported by many
universities suggest a climate where movement across borders is far from
hospitable. 36 0 An examination of the case law under the Economic Espionage Act,
discussed in the next section, shows possible adverse consequences on foreign born
employees and presents scenarios that may chill movement of labor both within the
United States and across borders more broadly by analogy.
In assessing the case law, these predicted adverse consequences need to be
understood in light of some of the justifications for movement across borders,
discussed above in Section II.A. However, national security does not appear to be a
salient concern in many of these cases. 36 1 Furthermore, many of these cases involve

smuggling and trafficking investigations, general and criminal alien investigations, identity and
benefit fraud investigations, compliance enforcement and worksite enforcement in 2006).
356 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2008 tbl. XX (2008),
available athttp://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FYO8-AR-TableXX.pdf. These statistics, however, report
denials based on categories such as becoming a public charge or criminal activities, such as
smuggling or prostitution. Id. In 2006, the category "Conversion of Confiscated U.S. Property for
Gain" was added although there have been only two reported cases of denials based on this category
in 2007, one of which was overcome. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE
2007 tbl. XX (2007), available at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY07AnnualReportTableXX.pdf.
This category would not cover misappropriation of trade secrets from United States companies since
they do not constitute "confiscated U.S. property." See 18 U.S.C. § 1831. However, property and
economic theft of confidential information could potentially be a basis for visa denials even though
current statistics do not collect such data. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE VISA
OFFICE 2008, supra.
357 See Jaques S. Gansler & Alice P. Gast, Academics and National Security Experts Must
Work Together, 54 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 44, July 11, 2008, at A-56 (2008) (stating that one-third
of all science and engineering Ph.D. degrees awarded in the U.S. are awarded to foreign-born
graduates).
358 See generally USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in
titles 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 31, 42, 47, 49, 50, United States Code) ("An Act To deter and punish terrorist
acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and
for other purposes.").
359 See JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., 1 PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS app. 4(B) (2d ed. 2009)

(listing all the cases prosecuted under the Economic Espionage Act, which totals thirty-three, and
ten of those prosecutions came after the 9/11 attacks).
360 See Gansler & Gast, supra note 357.
361 See United States v. Ye, 436 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534
(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Martin, 228
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000). But see United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 195 (3rd Cir. 1998) ("Only by
adopting a national scheme to protect U.S. proprietary economic information can we hope to
maintain our industrial and economic edge and thus safeguard our national security." (quoting S.
REP. NO. 104-359, at 11 (1996))).
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large, multinational companies which arguably realize scale economies. 36 2 Therefore,
restrictions on labor movement do not necessarily follow from the need to realize
economies of scale. 36 3 The focus on maximizing national welfare, however, may be a
dominant feature in these cases and parallels the rhetoric one sees in more informal
discussions of the Economic Espionage Act. 364 The express fear of economic
espionage replaced the fear of political and economic domination under the nuclear
umbrella of the Cold War in the 1990s, and this new fear was not necessarily red in
color. 365 Instead, the threat of economic espionage was ethnic, cultural, or national in
guise, often associated with the skilled worked from Taiwan. 366 To the extent that
this third basis for justifying the movement of people, and the attendant movement
of information and knowledge, is based on blatant, or even subtle, xenophobia, the
justification can be rejected. 36 7 Fear, rather than reason, enabled by legal power is
36 8
driving the application of the law in an illegitimate direction.
Within the context of international trade theory, we should be asking whether
there are gains that are being wasted or even unrealized in how the Economic
Espionage Act is being used. 36 9 The analysis of the case law in the next section
consequently looks to see whether the prosecutions chill the movement of labor, quell
the movement of information, and frustrate the realization of spillovers that could
result from the movement of labor and information across borders.

C. Assessing the Cases

The United States Department of Justice has brought thirty-five prosecutions
under the Economic Espionage Act from 1996 to 2007.370 Most of these have been

362 See, e.g., Yang, 281 F.3d at 540 (stating that the defendant's Taiwanese company and the
victim's American company were competitors).
363 See Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, & The Free Trade Constitution,
94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1104 (2008) (discussing that scale economies in American cities grew when
migrants moved across state lines).
364 Compare, e.g., Yang, 281 F.3d at 540 (stating that the defendant's Taiwanese company and
the victim's American company were competitors), with, e.g., Pooley, supra note 111, at 229 ("The
EEA has raised the stakes in the business of protecting trade secrets.").
365 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Focus on Economic Espionage, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ci/
economic.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2009) ("The Cold War is not over, it has merely moved into a
new arena: the global marketplace. The FBI estimates that every year billions of U.S. dollars are
lost to foreign competitors ... who cull intelligence out of shelved technologies by exploiting open
source and classified information known as trade secrets.").
366 See, e.g., Yang, 281 F.3d at 540 (stating that the defendant's worked for a Taiwanese
company).
367 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1955) (striking down legislation that was
based on the race of an individual).
368 James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment,And The Classifcation Of Obligations,
4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 15 (1999) (stating that the Economic Espionage Act was partly enacted out of,
"fear of espionage rings backed by foreign governments.").
369 Lan Cao, CorporateAnd ProductIdentity In The PostnationalEconomy.' Rethinking US.
Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 423 n.84 (2002) (indicating that a U.N. report stated that
expansion of international trade will help rid the world of poverty).
370 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Trade Secret/Economic Espionage Cases, http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminallcybercrime/ipcases.html#eea (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
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brought under section 1832, the provision dealing with theft of trade secret. 371 There
has been five indictments (two of which resulted in convictions) under section 1831,
the economic espionage provision. 372 The first indictment under section 1831 was
brought against two Japanese nationals in 2001.373 One of the defendants in the case
entered into a plea arrangement with the government. 374 Charges against the second
were eventually dismissed because the Japanese government failed to extradite the
defendant to the United States on the grounds that the Japanese government did not
recognize economic espionage as an extraditable offense. 375 The trials and appeals
that resulted from these thirty-six prosecutions have produced twenty-four district
376
Of
court and appellate opinions that substantively interpret portions of the Act.
these twenty-four opinions, eight are dismissals for lack of jurisdiction because the
Economic Espionage Act does not recognize a private right of action. 377 The
378
discussion in this section will focus on five principal cases: United States v. Martin,
United States v. Krumrei,379 United States v. Ye, 380 United States v. Hsu, 38 1 and
United States v. Yang382 (also known as the Four Pillars case). These five cases
illustrate how intellectual property law operates as a form of immigration policy,
affecting the movement of people and information across borders. In addition, I
discuss United States v. Case,38 3 an unpublished district court opinion that
illustrates many of the concerns raised with making trade secret misappropriation a
federal crime.
In studying these cases, those resulting in judicial opinions and those that did
not, I attempted to identify nationality and citizenship status of the thirty-five
defendants based on the judicial opinions and the United States Department of
Justice web site that summarizes the prosecutions. In some of the judicial opinions,
citizenship status was mentioned. In most, they were not. Nationality, however, was
mentioned occasionally, perhaps indirectly as a reference to the immigration status
371 See, e.g., United States v. Ye, 436 F.3d 1117, 1119 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (charging the
defendant with violations of 18 U.S.C §§ 1831-32).
372 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Chinese National Sentenced for Economic
Espionage (June 18, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08nsd545.html.
The five indictments are United States v. Okamoto and Serizawa on May 8, 2001; United States v.
Fei Ye and Ming Zhong on December 4, 2002, resulting in conviction on December 14, 2006; United
States v. Meng on December 13, 2006, resulting in a conviction on June 18, 2008; United States v.
Lan Lee & Yuefei Ge on September 26, 2007; and United States v. Dongfan "Greg' Chung on
February 6, 2008. Id.
373 First Foreign Indictment, supranote 23.
374 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Scientist Pleads Guilty to Providing False Statements
Regarding Trade Secret Theft (May 1, 2002), available at, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/serizawaPlea.htm.
375See generally Tetsuya Morimoto, First Japanese Denial of U.S. Extradition Request:
Economic Espionage Case, 20 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 288 (2004) (discussing the case).
376 See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 10-13 (1st Cir. 2000).
377 See, e.g., Pisani v. Van Iderstine, No. CA 07-187S, 2007 WL 2319844, at *3 (D. R.I. Aug. 9,

2007).
378 228 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000).

379258 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2001).
380 436 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2006).
381 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998).
382 281 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2002).
383 Crim. No. 3:06-CR-210-TSL-LRA, 2007 WL 1746399 (S.D. Miss. June 15, 2007).
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of the defendant. My count is that twenty of the thirty-five cases involved a
defendant or defendants who were born outside the United States. Roughly half of
these twenty involved a defendant with a background either in China or Taiwan.
The remaining cases involved either defendants who were United States-born or
nationals from Europe or Canada, but whose background was not readily
ascertainable from the text of the judicial opinion or the summaries on the web site.
The fact that more than half of the prosecutions involved non-United States
nationals illustrates how the Act serves to globalize trade secret law by preventing
appropriation across borders.
The defendants in these cases typically worked for a high technology company in
the software, hardware, biotechnology, or biomedical fields. The trade secrets
appropriated ranged from DNA cell lines 38 4 to the diagnostic tests used by Microsoft
to test its software suite. 38 5 For example, in Ye, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") apprehended the defendant, a Chinese born, naturalized United States
citizen, as he was about to board a flight to China with his co-defendant. 38 6 Ye was
caught with information related to a microprocessor project called Supervision
developed by several Silicon Valley companies, which he was taking to a company he
formed in China. 38 7 In Okamoto, the sole prosecution under section 1831, the codefendants were accused of taking DNA and cell line reagents from the Cleveland
Clinic Foundation for the purpose of transporting the materials to Japan. 388 Hsu, a
Taiwanese national who was a technical director for a Taiwanese company and
working in the United States, was caught by an FBI sting operation involving
purported proprietary information relating to the anti-cancer drug Taxol. 38 9 Hsu's
case was the first brought under the Economic Espionage Act and resulted in a
conviction for an attempted violation of the Act. 390 In each of these cases, the act of
transferring proprietary information to a third party was not completed, and the
circumstances were highly charged. 39 1 The defendants were involved in acts that
raised suspicions, but also raise questions about the policy effects of the Act on
392
technology transfer and the international movement of labor.
The problem was best stated by the court in United States v. Martin, a case that
resulted in prosecutions for violations of the Economic Espionage Act and mail and
wire fraud acts of Martin, the CEO of a Wyoming vaccine company, and Camp, an

384 See First Foreign Indictment, supra note 23.
385 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Connecticut Man Pleads Guilty in U.S. Court to
Selling
Stolen
Microsoft
Windows
Source
Code
(Aug.
29,
2005),
available at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/genovesePlea.htm.
386 United States v. Ye, 436 F.3d 1117, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2006).
387 See id.
388 First Foreign Indictment, supranote 23.
389 United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1998).
390 See id. at 191; see also ADAM L. PENENBERG & MARC BARRY, SPOOKED: ESPIONAGE IN
CORPORATE AMERICA 67-68 (2000) (noting the Yangs, defendants in the Four Pillars case, referred
to the Hsu case shortly before their incarceration).
391 See, e.g., Hsu, 155 F.3d at 191-93.
392 See, e.g., id.; see also Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placinga Glove on the Invisible Hand: How
Intellectual PropertyRights May Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D),
18 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 381, 436 (2008) ("[T]he inherent tension between intellectual property and
innovation reveals a deeper complex of problems that require concerted action to address.").
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unhappy employee of IDEXX, a Maine biotech start-up. 39 3 The two were indicted on
a count of conspiracy under the Economic Espionage Act, in addition to the mail and
wire fraud counts. 394 Camp pled guilty in exchange for testifying against Martin,
who was convicted, ordered to pay restitution, and was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment. 39 5
The conviction was based, in part, on a long term email
correspondence between the two which ostensibly read as a wooing of Camp by
Martin (at many levels) to leave the Maine company and move out to join the
company in Wyoming. 39 6 As part of this correspondence, Camp sent upon Martin's
request information of proprietary products and software from the Maine company
where she worked. 397 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
upholding the conviction, wrote:
A careful reading of the seven-month e-mail communication between Dr.
Stephen Martin and Caryn Camp could lead to the conclusion Martin and
his counsel urge-that this is simply a pen-pal relationship between a lonely
Maine lab technician and a reclusive California scientist. However, the
evidence could also lead a reader to the conclusion that something far more
sinister was afoot: that an originally harmless communication mushroomed
into a conspiracy to steal trade secrets and transport stolen property
interstate, and that the electronic mail and U.S. mails were used to further
a scheme to defraud IDEXX. Because we find there was sufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to conclude the latter beyond any reasonable doubt, we
39 8
AFFIRM the defendant's conviction on all counts.
The court's hint of ambiguity is revealing about the scope of the Economic Espionage
Act. 399 The appellant's brief and an initial read of the facts of the case suggest a
story of employee mobility. 400 Camp, a frustrated employee, seeks opportunity at
Martin's company based on its website. 401 Martin, after failing to acquire the desired
technology from IDEXX, sees an opportunity when an IDEXX employee calls. 402 It is
the opportunistic behavior on the part of Martin combined with the purloining of a
company's assets that support the more sinister read endorsed by the court. 403 The
Economic Espionage Act, the court leaves us to understand, aids in policing this
unproductive and larcenous form of employee recruitment that seems not to be
404
supported by the creation of spillovers or genuine competition.
When read in a sinister light, the facts of the Martin case echo the notorious
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit opinion in E.1 du Pont de
393

United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 6-11, 19 (1st Cir. 2000).

Id. at 6.
Brief of Appellant at 1, United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (No. 00-1039),
2000 WL 35562248.
396 Martin, 228 F.3d at 6-10.
394
395

397 Id.

Id. at 19.
See id. at 19.
400 See Brief of Appellant at 5-15, United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000).
401 See Martin, 228 F.3d at 6-7.
402 Id. at 7.
403 Id. at 7-10.
404 Id. at 10-13, 19.
398

399
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Nemours & Co. v. Christopher,405 in which the court found that using a plan to
flyover a competitor's lab in order to take pictures constituted misappropriation of a
trade secret under state law. 40 6 Unable to base its decision on some independent
illegal act by the defendant (the flyover, for example, did not constitute a trespass),
the court held that the behavior was improper as a violation of the ethics of business
competition. 40 7 The defendant was taking a free ride or, perhaps more accurately,
was choosing not to compete by building a better product or by designing around
existing technologies. 408 Instead, the defendant was choosing to make a naked copy
of what the plaintiff was doing. 40 9 Whether the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit expanded the scope of business ethics under state trade secret law is
a much debated question. 410 After the decision in Martin, however, one has to
conclude that the flyover at issue in Christopher Brothers would rise to federal
criminal liability with the resulting fines and jail time. 411 Criminalization of such
conduct is arguably over-deterrence of what has been deemed to be unethical, noncompetitive, and free-riding behavior. One has to wonder why state trade secret law
or a civil federal remedy would not serve the purpose of deterring the sanctioned
business plan in Martin.
The facts of Martin pertain to the misappropriation of trade secret across state
lines within the United States. 412 The majority of the cases under the Economic
Espionage Act involve misappropriation by non-United States nationals who steal,
attempt to steal or conspire to steal trade secrets with the intent to take them
overseas. 413 In United States v. Hsu, 414 the first case brought under the Economic
Espionage Act, the defendants were Taiwanese nationals who contacted an FBI
undercover agent to obtain the proprietary formulas and secret processes associated
with the manufacture of Taxol, an anti-cancer drug made and sold by Bristol-MeyersSquibb. 415 There is no doubt that the defendants were trying to steal proprietary
information, circumventing the appropriate commercial channels of licensing or
reverse engineering the protected trade secrets. 416 Nonetheless, the case provides a
troubling precedent because the court allowed the sentence of the one convicted
defendant to stand despite the defense of legal impossibility. 417 Hsu was arrested
after receiving what he thought were the requested trade secrets from the
419
undercover agent.418 Instead, the information was not proprietary at all.

407

431 F.2d 1012 (1970).
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1015-16.

408

Id.

409

Id.

405
406

See e.g., Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, StealAng Trade Secrets Etically,47 MD. L. REV. 1076,
1077 (1988).
410
411
412
413
414
415
416

417
418

419

See United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2000).
Id. at 6-10.
See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 191-93 (1998).
155 F.3d 189.
Id. at 191-93.

Id.
Id. at 198-204.
Id. at 193.
United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 629 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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Nonetheless, Hsu was found criminally liable for attempted theft of trade secrets. 420
The court rejected his defense that it was impossible to complete the crime when
what was stolen was not in fact a trade secret. 421 Such a defense would undermine
the ability of the government to undertake sting operations like the one against
422
Hsu.
The problem is that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's
decision in Hsu gives the government wide license to undertake sting operations in
order to ferret out potential economic spies. 423 Such sting operations potentially chill
legitimate inquiries by employers who are attempting to poach employees and
employees who may be interest in a move. 424 A potential bright line to avoid being
caught in the web of a sting operation or, more to the point, being found liable for
violating the Economic Espionage Act is to not seek out or offer proprietary
information of any sort.425 Discussions of employment need to be distanced from any
discussion of valuable firm assets, whether tangible or intangible.426 But even here
there is a concern that the government can uses its authority under the Act broadly,
casting a sense of paranoia or concern over any employee who is foreign. 42 7 In United
States v. Ye, 428 the defendants were caught with proprietary information that the
employees had obtained without permission from several major Silicon Valley
companies. 429 The defendants were apprehended at the San Francisco International
Airport as they were passing through security to board a plane to the People's
Republic of China. 430
Convictions were based on attempted violations of and
conspiracy to violate the Economic Espionage Act. 431 The defendants moved pre-trial
for the use of experts to determine which of the purloined information constituted
trade secrets. 432 The government moved to protect the information under the
provisions of the Act that allow for protective orders. 433 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in favor of the government on this issue with the
result that a government can bring a case even if there may not be any trade secrets
at issue in a case. 434 As the decision illustrates, the scope of both attempt and
435
conspiracy liability is quite broad.
420

See ANNUAL

421

Hsu, 155 F.3d at 198-204.
Id. at 202.
See id. at 192-93.
Compare id. at 191-93 (seeking the alleged trade secret at seemingly any cost), with United

422
423
424

REPORT,

supranote 30, at 2.

States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 6-10 (1st Cir. 2000) (indicating a situation that may have begun as a
disgruntled employee seeking a new job).
425 See Martin, 228 F.3d at 6-10, 18-19 (offering such information opens oneself up to
conviction).
426 See id.
427 See J. Thomas Coffin, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 23
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 527, 528-29 (2000) (using terms "very broad" and "sweeping" to
describe Congress' grant of authority under the Economic Espionage Act).
428 436 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2006).
429 Id. at 1119-20.
431

Id.
Id. at 1119.

432

Id. at 1124 (granting the U.S. writ of mandamus preventing the defendants' motion).

430

Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1124.
435 See id.
433
434
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The facts of United States v. Krumrei436 illustrate some limits on the scope of
the Act. Krumrei worked for a company that was using a laminating process
developed by Wilsonart. 437 Krumrei's employer was using the process under license
from Wilsonart. 438 Krumrei approached a competitor of Wilsonart with information
about the process, and the competitor informed Wilsonart, who hired an investigator
to approach Krumrei with the request to obtain proprietary information from
Krumrei. 439 Based on Krumrei's offers to transfer proprietary information to the
investigator, Krumrei was indicted for attempting to steal trade secrets. 440 He pled
441
guilty to the charge and avoided a jail sentence but was fined for the offense.
Permitted to appeal as a condition of his plea, Krumrei raised an attack on the
Economic Espionage Act as being constitutionally vague. 442 The basis for the
vagueness claim was the definition of trade secrets that required a showing that the
trade secret had taken reasonable steps to protect the information as a secret. 443 The
court rejected his challenge, holding that Krumrei knew that the information he was
passing on was proprietary, and therefore the statute was not vague as applied to
him. 444 The facts of Krumrei present a classic application of the Economic Espionage
Act, criminalizing the attempt to transfer information that one knows is proprietary
to a competitor. 445 However, Krumrei's conduct would also lead to liability under
state trade secret law. 446 Therefore, the recurring question is whether the potential
chilling effects of the Act are balanced by the benefit of deterring or punishing
447
conduct that, absent the Economic Espionage Act, would otherwise be legal.
Perhaps the most intensive prosecution under the Act is United States v.
Yang,448 the first conviction for federal theft of trade secret through a jury trial.
Yang was the CEO of Four Pillars, a Taiwanese company that engaged in the
adhesive business whose main competitor was the United States company Avery
Dennison. 449 Dr. Lee was a research scientist working for Avery Dennison, also
Taiwanese, who met Yang in the late 1980's and was convinced to pass on
proprietary information about products under development by his employer. 45 0 The
FBI became aware of this activity in the 1990's and secured Dr. Lee's cooperation to
engage in a sting operation to catch Yang. 45 1 In the later 1990's, Dr. Lee and an
undercover FBI agent met with Yang in an Ohio hotel room and passed on what
purported to be confidential information about Avery Dennison's business, contained
436

258 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2001).

437 Id. at 536-37.
438 Id. at 536.
439 Id. at 537.
440

Id.

441 See

id.

442

Id.

443

Id. at 538.

444 Id. at 539.
445

See id. at 536-37.

446 See, e.g., Illinois Trade Secrets Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/1-9 (2009).
447 See Carr, supra note 51, at 180-209 (analyzing the cases and making an argument that the
Economic Espionage Act fills a significant gap in the law).
448 281 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2002).
449 Id. at 540.
450
451

Id.
Id.
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in an envelope marked confidential. 452 Yang was arrested and indicted under the
Economic Espionage Act. 453 The conviction ended with a penalty of five million
dollars under the United States Sentencing Guidelines after a trial and appeals that
finally came to an end in 2007. 4 5 4 The nearly decade long prosecution is an
archetypical 455 Economic Espionage Act conviction, involving a foreign spy using a
United States employee as a conduit for appropriating confidential business
information. 456 The penalty reflected the nature of the threat posed by Yang's
conduct, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the
case, finding that the sentence was too high in light of Avery Dennison's involvement
in the sting operation. 457 In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the reduction of the sentence by the trial court on remand to two
458
million dollars.
The 2006 indictment against former employees of Eaton, a Mississippi aerospace
company is the most recent example of the shadow that the Economic Espionage Act
cases over employee mobility in technology industries. 459
Several employees of
Eaton departed the company in the early 2000's to accept employment with Frisby, a
competitor for aerospace contracts and for government grants, in Mississippi. 460 The
indictment charged violations of mail and wire fraud and a conspiracy to violate the
Economic Espionage Act. 461 Several overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were
alleged by the government, including email correspondences with employees at
Frisby while the defendants were still in the employ of Eaton, email correspondences
by the defendants to former colleagues at Eaton recruiting them to join Frisby, and
the transfer of specifications for hydraulic parts and other products manufactured by
Eaton by the defendants to Frisby. 4 2 The district court dismissed many of the
counts as being void for vagueness although the court did not dismiss the counts
based on the transfer of the parts, since they were arguably concrete trade secrets
that were transferred to a competitor. 463 What counts that survived eventually were
dismissed, upon affirmance by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, because of the general five year statute of limitations for federal criminal

452

Id. at 540-41.

453 Id. at 541.

See United States v. Four Pillars Enter. Co., 253 F. App'x 502, 505, 515 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 504. The case is archetypal in the sense that the conduct at issue was the type of
conduct that motivated Congress to enact the Act. See 142 CONG. REC. S12211-03 (1996) (statement
of Sen. Kohl). "This problem is even worse when foreign governments have specifically focused [sic]
on American companies in order to steal information from them. American companies are not
prepared or equipped to fight off this kind of systematic targeting." Id. at S 12211.
456 See Yang, 281 F.3d at 539-41.
457 Id. at 552.
458 FourPillars,253 Fed. App'x at 505, 515.
459 United States v. Case, Crim. No. 3:06-CR-210-WHB-JCS, 2008 WL 1827429, at *2-3 (S.D.
Miss. Apr. 23, 2008), affd 288 F. App'x 212 (5th Cir. 2008), supersededby, 309 F. App'x 883 (5th Cir.
2009).
460 Id. at *2.
461 Id. at *2-3.
462 See id.
463 Id. at * 11.
454

455
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offenses. 464 Although ultimately an unsuccessful indictment, the example illustrates
how far the Act can be taken to criminalize the movement of employees between
firms and the potential risks and costs that both firms and workers in high velocity
labor markets face.
There are three lessons to glean from the Economic Espionage Act cases. The
first is the potentially chilling effects of the Act on the movement of labor across
borders. This chilling effect on the movement of labor has consequences for the
movement of information and knowledge across borders. The concern stems from the
possible over-deterrence of labor mobility and employment because of the
criminalization of conduct that may otherwise be actionable under the state law of
trade secret.
Not only has the Economic Espionage Act upped the ante for
misappropriation of trade secret, 46 5 it has expanded the scope of illegal conduct
through the imposition of attempt and conspiracy liability. 46 6 The second lesson,
however, is that the courts have tempered the possible adverse effects of the Act by
prosecuting cases where defendants have taken or attempted to take concrete assets
from the trade secret owner. 46 7 Although there are many troubling cases, many of
the thirty-six prosecutions sanctions conduct that is close to the model of the freeriding company that seems to solely mimic or copy a competitor rather than compete
through reverse engineering or independent invention. 468 Despite some tendencies to
temper the effects of the Act, the aggressive use of sting operations is a source of
concern by casting a pale on business transactions and employment hiring
decisions. 46 9 These concerns support the third lesson. Many of the acts that form the
basis for an Economic Espionage Act prosecution could also have been reached under
other, less potentially draconian areas of the law, such as traditional trade secret
law. 470 What the Economic Espionage Act may offer is a federal forum and there are
possible benefits from federalizing trade secret law. 471 But the machinery of federal
criminal prosecutions is a blunt tool to bring to the activity at issue. 472 In Section III,
I take these lessons from a decade of case law to propose reforms to intellectual
property law that can further temper the negative effects of the Act on global labor
mobility and competition.

464 United States v. Case, 288 F. App'x 212, 212 (5th Cir. 2008). However, the Court granted
the government's petition for rehearing and then reversed its earlier decision related to Counts 9 &
12. United States v. Case, 309 F. App'x 883, 886 (5th Cir. 2009).
465 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2006) (making misappropriation of a trade secret a criminal act
punishable by imprisonment).
466 See id. § 1832(a)(4)-(5).
467 See, e.g., Case, 309 F. App'x at 886 (reversing the two counts related to hard evidence that
were earlier dismissed).
468 See e.g., United States v. Four Pillars Enter. Co., 253 F. App'x 502, 505-07 (6th Cir. 2007).
469 See e.g., United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 540-41 (6th Cir. 2002).
470 See, e.g., Illinois Trade Secrets Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/1-9 (2009).
471 See, e.g., Yang, 281 F.3d at 540-41 (indicating that the FBI's resources are available to
investigate cases under the federal Economic Espionage Act of 1996).
472 See id. (indicating that the FBI will use the full range of technology to catch an alleged
violator).
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III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Economic Espionage Act interferes with the benefits that arise from labor
mobility in high technology markets, or high velocity labor markets to adopt the
shorthand. 473 The impediment is particularly troubling given the Act's deliberate
targeting of non-United States workers and the movement of technology and
knowledge across national borders. 474 The legitimate goals of the Act, to target acts
that merely imitate competitors rather than compete based on innovation, are
addressed by existing state laws. 475 The criminalization and nationalization of trade
secret laws serve largely to deter the desirable movement of people and information
across borders.
This section proposes ways to cure the adverse effects of the Act by (i) clarifying
its narrow purpose and (ii) suggesting reforms of the extraterritorial application of
other types of intellectual property law. I conclude that the biggest problem with the
Economic Espionage Act is its turning a matter of private law into a federal crime,
which permits the unleashing of governmental power untethered from, and hence
untempered by, defined private or broadly public interests. Power in defense of the
national market place is troubling in the context of intellectual property law. One
solution, I conclude, is to make traditional trade secret more closely allied to the law
of property and thereby define the goals of the law in terms of very narrow private
interests that can be readily ascertained and protected. The challenge is to adopt the
limiting principle of property, as a counter to the uncontainable goal of protecting the
nation, without also adopting the acquisitiveness and private exclusion that has
hindered intellectual property law in other ways. The section concludes with an
analysis of how property can counter the nation as a basis for better defining the
public interest goals of intellectual property law.

A. Clarifying the Purpose andApplieation of the Act
The Economic Espionage Act was enacted in the wake of several high profile
cases of industrial espionage in the early Nineties. 476 These cases turned industrial
espionage into an ideological and politico-legal substitute for the Cold War as the
rising economies in Asia were viewed as the new threat. 477 Although it did not
473 See United States v. Case, Crim. No. 3:06-CR-210-TSL-LRA, 2007 WL 1746399, at *1 (S.D.
Miss. June 15, 2007) (demonstrating that five defendants moving from one employer to the next in
the aerospace industry have been dragged into years of litigation).
474 See, e.g., United States v. Ye, 436 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2006).
475 See, e.g., Illinois Trade Secrets Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/1-9 (2009).
476 See Carr, supra note 51, at 162-63.
477 142 CONG. REC. S12211-03 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
Since the end of the cold war, our old enemies and our traditional allies have
been shifting the focus of their spy apparatus. Alarmingly, the new target of
foreign espionage is our industrial base. But for too many years, we were
complacent and did not heed these warnings. And we left ourselves vulnerable to
the ruthless plundering of our country's vital information. We did not address this
new form of espionage-a version of spying as dangerous to our national well-being
as any form of classic espionage. Today, that complacency ends.
Id. at 12211.
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involve theft of commercial trade secrets, the espionage case brought against Wen Ho
Lee in 1999 (which eventually resulted in a dismissal and apology to Dr. Lee)
provides an example of the atmosphere that gave raise to concerns over spying and
theft of valuable information. 478 This concern with espionage dovetailed with the
growing movement touting strong intellectual property rights as an ingredient for
479
domestic economic growth and international competitiveness in the 1990's.
However, the Economic Espionage Act is decidedly different from the other pieces of
intellectual property legislation that were enacted contemporaneously. 48 0 The Act
makes intellectual property infringement, traditionally a private matter handled
through private litigation, a federal crime. 48 1 In this way, the Act raises the stakes
for those who use information protected by intellectual property law and are engaged
in industries that drive the processes of innovation and technology development.482
By using intellectual property law to promote the goals of global economic
security and competitiveness, the Economic Espionage Act is a statute at war with
itself.48 3 It taps the powers of the national government, particularly its powers to
enforce criminal laws, to a matter of economic and business regulation. 48 4 Although
there are many criminal provisions to federal business regulation (such as the
securities and the antitrust laws), the criminalization of state trade secret law makes
the theft of private property a federal offense and is distinguishable from the threats
to public markets posed by manipulating securities markets or by forming price
cartels. 48 5 Furthermore, the object of the Economic Espionage Act is a vague, often
difficult to define category of property called information, which is often entwined in
the know-how of a firm and of its employees. 486 Admittedly, securities law also
criminalizes the misuse of information, but in the context of securities, the misuse is
often made concrete in the form of financial instruments and standardized market
relationships. 48 7 Trade secret abuse, as a case like Martinor Case shows, can extend
478 See generallyWEN Ho LEE WITH HELEN ZIA, MY COUNTRY VERSUS ME: THE FIRST-HAND
ACCOUNT BY THE Los ALAMoS SCIENTIST WHO WAS FALSELY ACCUSED OF BEING A SPY (2001)
(detailing Wen Ho Lee's experiences with the FBI, his arrest, and imprisonment for alleged
economic espionage).
479 See RYAN, supra note 204, at 67-72 (documenting the growing private support for
legislative and executive efforts promoting intellectual property rights domestically and at the
international level in the late 1980's and through the 1990's).
480 Compare Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1831-39 (2006)) (criminalizing forieng theft and transfer of
United States trade secrets), with e.g., Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at title 17, United States Code (2006)) (updating traditional
copyright protection in the United States).
481 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (asserting that misappropriation of a trade secret is punishable by up to
ten years in prison).

482

See id.

See id. §§ 1831-39.
See, e.g., United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 540-41 (6th Cir. 2002) (using the FBI to
arrest a suspected perpetrator).
485 Compare §§ 1831-39 (criminalizing trade secret theft),
with Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77 (2006) (criminalizing securities fraud), and Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-40 (criminalizing price-fixing between competitors).
486 See, e.g,, United States v. Case, Crim. No. 3:06-CR-210-TSL-LRA, 2007 WL 1746399, at *1,
*4-*6 (S.D. Miss. June 15, 2007) (dismissing many of the counts as statutorily vague as applied to
483
484

this case's set of facts).
487 See 15 U.S.C. § 77x.
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to a wide range of communications, including employment solicitations. 48 8 However,
the less troubling Economic Espionage Act cases involve the transfer of concrete
property, such as the disks in Martin48 9 or the parts in Case.490 Even when physical
property is involved, the vexing question still remains as to whether the concrete
property constitutes a trade secret. 491 Nonetheless, the Economic Espionage Act, by
ostensibly attempting to promote innovation and global markets, may impede the
492
lifeblood of these markets by deterring the movement of people and of information.
Resolution of this fundamental problem rests on more clearly delineating the
purpose of the Act. It is not a tool for national security. 493 Nor is it a tool to police
national borders against the entry of foreign workers. 494 In short, it is not a type of
immigration policy. 495 Instead, the Act is designed to protect against the theft of
certain types of industrial property to benefit third parties. 496 That is, as a practical
matter, all that the Act can or should do. 497 The goals of security and immigration
are tangential and better served by other laws. 498 The argument so far may read as
one for limited government. Actually, the argument is one for the clear and
necessary exercise of governmental power, especially its power to enforce criminal
laws. When the Act is seemingly used for purposes other than protecting industrial
property, especially ones that interfere with the movement of people and information
as I have documented in this Article, then the clarity of the law and the
appropriateness of exercising governmental power becomes questioned. 499 The
example of Wen Ho Lee is apposite on this point.500 His prosecution was based on the
claim that he had used sophisticated mathematical techniques to solve problems for
the Chinese government.5 0 1 Dr. Lee dismissed these charges as "nonsense" and
compared them to "saying a discussion about algebra is the same as giving them
secrets."5 0 2 Infusing national security objectives into trade secret law risks turning
any potentially valuable information into a protected trade secret and the loss of
503
private industrial property into a threat to national security.
But even if the application of the law is clear, there is still the pervading
question of whether the law is necessary. Much of the conduct could be reached
through existing law that provides state remedies in state and federal courts through
488

See Case, 2007 WL 1746399, at *1; United States v. Martin, 228 F. 3d 1, 12-19 (1st Cir.

2000).
Martin, 228 F. 3d at 9-10.
See Case, 2007 WL 1746399, at *1.
491 See id. at *12-13.
492 See supra Section II.B.
493See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2006) (providing specific remedies for specific actions that do not
necessarily deal with national security).
494 See id.(providing remedies against domestic as well as foreign actors).
489
490

495Id.
496

Id.

497Id.

498 E.g., 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1) (2006) (stating that the mission of the Department of Homeland
Security is to prevent and reduce terrorist attacks, while also minimizing the damage terrorist
attacks cause).
499See supra Section II.B.
500 See LEE WITH ZIA, supranote 478, at 35-85.
501 Id. at 270-73.
502 Id. at 272.
503 See id.
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private litigation and some limited state criminal law remedies. 50 4 Limitations of the
regime prior to the enactment of the Economic Espionage Act are those associated
5 05
with state laws: the jurisdictional reach of the courts and the conflict of laws.
These limitations suggest that the main benefits of the Economic Espionage Act may
be those associated with federal law: national jurisdiction and uniformity. 506 A
further complication is that much of the activity may involve extraterritorial reach of
the law to enjoin conduct that occurs by actors outside the boundaries of the United
States.5 07 To the extent that the Act goes beyond resolving these limitations, there is
a case to be made that the statutory scheme is overbroad.5 08 Consequently, I focus
for the rest of this section on how other areas of intellectual property law can be
reformed to address some of the limitations that the Economic Espionage Act ideally
should correct. My goal is not to propose adopting these reforms in addition to the
current Act. Instead, my argument is that these proposals are desirable substitutes
for the Economic Espionage Act, correcting some of the limitations of traditional
state secret law without introducing the possible harmful effects on high velocity
labor markets.

B. CollateralReforms
Intellectual property rights expand with a ratchet. Expansions in rights occur
without corresponding limits or contractions. With that caveat in mind, I present
these proposals as substitutes for the Economic Espionage Act, ways to limit the
application of the federal criminal law by expanding the availability of civil remedies
for intellectual property infringement in the global marketplace. As a practical policy
matter, I do think it is unlikely that any of these proposals would be adopted as a
substitute for the Economic Espionage Act, given the politics of intellectual property
reform.5 09 Nonetheless, I end with a discussion of these proposals to highlight the
particular problems that lead to the enactment and enforcement of the Act.
Conceptually, the discussion of these proposals identifies the specific policy gaps in
intellectual property law that the Act grew to fill and even further expand the
5 10
enforcement of trade secret law at the federal level.

504 See 3 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 12.06 (2009)

(indicating the states

have criminalized trade secret misappropriation); see also GHOSH ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PRIVATE RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND THE REGULATION OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY 65-71
(Thomson 2007) (discussing state criminal trade secret statutes).
505 See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537-659 (2005);
Trade Secrets Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/1-9 (2009).
506 See Carr, supra note 51, at 209 (indicating that the Economic Espionage Act fills gaps left
by state trade secret tort law).
507 See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 193 n.2. (3d Cir. 1998).
508 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2006).
509 See 142 CONG. REC. S12211-03, S12211-14 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kohl) (stating that the
bullying of American corporations stops with the passing of the Economic Espionage Act).
510 See Carr, supra note 51, at 209.
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1. ExtraterritorialApplication of PatentLaw
The Economic Espionage Act is designed to prevent the unauthorized export of
protected information.5 11 The statute limits the protected subject matter to trade
secret, and, as a result, the Act prevents the misappropriation of valuable
information that might be developed into a patentable invention either in the United
States or overseas.5 12 To the extent that other intellectual property is given more
extraterritorial enforcement, the need for the Economic Espionage Act to prevent
foreign misappropriation of economically valuable information is obviated.5 13 One
particular avenue for expanding the rights of intellectual property owners outside the
boundaries of the United States is through permitting extraterritorial enforcement of
514
the Patent Act.
The Patent Act is largely silent about the extraterritorial enforcement of claims
for patent infringement.5 15 Section 271(f) grants to the patent owner the right to sue
an individual for combining overseas unpatentable components exported from the
516
United States into a machine or manufacture patented in the United States.
Similarly, section 271(g) allows the patent owner to sue the user of a process
patented in the United States if he uses the process to produce a product that is
imported into the United States. 51 7 Courts have been split on how to apply patent
law extraterritorially both in situations where the statute arguably applies and in
situations where the statute is silent. The United States Supreme Court has
generally not favored extraterritorial application of the Patent Act, holding in two
notable cases that such application requires a clear directive from Congress.518 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, on the other hand, has been
more unpredictable about extraterritorial enforcement.5 19
Commentators have

See id.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39.
513 See generally TRIPS Agreement arts. 41-61 (allowing for the enforcement of intellectual
property rights in its member nations).
511

512

514

See 35 U.S.C. § 184 (2006). It should be pointed out that U.S. patent law already regulates

the export of technology and information through the requirement of foreign filing licenses in order
to file a patent application overseas. See id. The foreign filing license requirement controls the
transfer of information through patent applications. Id.
515 See id. § 271(a); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritorialityin US. Patent Law,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2124 (2008) ("[Mlany commentators view patent law as the most
territorially based form of intellectual property .... and has begun to place pressure on these
historical territorial limits in patent law.").
516
517

35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
Id. § 271(g).

518 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 459-60, 462 (2007) (holding that golden disks
from which software was copied is not a component for infringement action brought under
section 271W); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram, 406 U.S. 518, 523, 531-32 (1972) (exporting
components of patented machine for assembly overseas not patent infringement), superseded by
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (enacted 1984); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 198-99 (1856) (holding
that activity on a foreign vessel in a United States port is not patent infringement).
519 Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1338-41 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that
golden disks are components under section 271(f) for Internet based application); Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (limiting extraterritorial reach of
injunction).
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sought more clarity on the issue, generally pointing towards recognizing
20
extraterritorial application of United States patent law.5
Without settling on a particular standard for extraterritoriality, I endorse the
arguments in favor of stronger extraterritorial enforcement of United States patent
law for the reason that it would alleviate the need for the Economic Espionage Act as
a tool for combating what is viewed as the theft of knowledge protected by
intellectual property law. Extraterritorial enforcement would allow private rights
holders to enforce high value intellectual property that is being infringed by overseas
entities and allow rights holders a source of value for their intellectual property
assets.5 21 Furthermore, permitting extraterritorial application of patent law would
be less intrusive on global high velocity labor markets than the enforcement of trade
secret rights through statutory schemes like the Economic Espionage Act.5 22 While
trade secret law protects information and knowledge that is often embodied in
human beings, 523 patent law protects embodiments of knowledge in processes and
products that are protected from unauthorized infringement. 524 Compared with
trade secret law, actions under the Patent Act targets the embodiments of
information in commodities and therefore interferes less with the movement of
people.5 25 Extraterritorial enforcement of patent rights would be consistent with the
free flow of labor across national borders. The cost, however, may be on the free flow
of physical goods or components across borders. 526 With enhanced extraterritorial
enforcement, overseas companies may be deterred from exporting products into the
United States for concerns over being held liable for patent infringement.5 27 In this
way, extraterritorial enforcement of patent rights acts as a tariff on the movement of
goods into the United States. Such a tariff may limit the desirable effects of free
trade, but arguably it does not limit the spillover effects that are created by the
distribution of knowledge. Consequently, the relative costs to innovation may be
smaller for the extraterritorial application of patent law than for the more vigorous
criminal enforcement of trade secret law at the federal level.

520 See Holbrook, supra note 515, at 2163-67 (endorsing an approach to patent law
extraterritoriality that expressly takes into consideration foreign patent law).
521 Id. at 2163-67.
522 Compare id. at 2163-67 (endorsing an approach to patent law extraterritoriality that
expressly takes into consideration foreign patent law), with 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2006) (restricting
labor movement across borders as it is currently applied).
523 See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming the district
court's holding that the Illinois Trade Secrets Act prevented an employee from ever divulging the
trade secrets of his former employer to a new employer).
524 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
525 Id. §§ 271; 281-97 (defining infringement, available remedies, and restrictions to those
remedies).
526 See Holbrook, supra note 515, at 2163-67.
527 See, e.g., Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 366 F.3d 1311,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming the ITC's exclusion order of the appellant's product from the U.S.)
Compared to litigation in the district courts, a relatively convenient way to stop infringing products
from entering the United States exists at the United States International Trade Commission. See,
e.g., id.
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2. JurisdictionalIssues in Trade Secret Law
Permitting more liberal extraterritorial application of trade secret by private
owners may obviate the need for federal criminal laws designed to combat trade
secret misappropriation. For example, reducing the Economic Espionage Act to a
federal tort law with a civil remedy may suffice. 528 But arguably such expansions of
causes of actions brought by private parties could potentially be just as inhibitive on
the free movement of people and ideas as the Economic Espionage Act. 529 However,
trade secret law, privately enforced, could permit the owner to prosecute against
foreign entities without intruding on the movement of labor if the jurisdictional rules
530
permitted enforcement of private trade secret rights against foreign entities.
Current law does facilitate trade secret claims against foreign entities. 531 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held, for instance, that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act does not prohibit state trade secret claims against foreign
sovereigns.5 32 The court reasoned that the misappropriation of a private right did not
fall within the domain of traditional sovereign powers. 533 This decision is critical for
534
expanding private rights under state trade secret law against foreign entities,
something that the Economic Espionage Act does, but through the expansion of
535
federal prosecutorial power.
A limitation, however, on the enforcement of state law claims is the rules on
personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. 536 Courts have, on many occasions,
found that a state's long arm statute cannot be used to bring foreign sovereigns or
537
entities into state or federal courts because of lack of contacts with the forum.
Even when jurisdiction is found, a court may still find that the United States does
not provide the convenient forum in which to adjudicate the claims.5 38 Both personal
528 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2006) (stating that an individual in violation of the statute
"shall ... be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both"), with 35 U.S.C.
§ 281 ("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.").
529 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39.
530 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987) (requiring
that the defendant have "minimum contacts" in order for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction

over the defendant).

18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39.
BP Chems. Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo (Group) Corp., 285 F.3d 677, 688 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding
exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act on commercial activity in the United States).
531

532

533 Id.
534

See id.

§§ 1831-39.
See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 261 (1981) (reinstating a district court's
dismissal of a wrongful death suit related to an air crash in Scotland on the ground of forum non
conveniens).
537 See, e.g., BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 286 (3d Cir. 2000)
(finding no personal jurisdiction over a Taiwanese company); LinkCo Inc. v. Nichimen, Corp., 164 F.
Supp. 2d 203, 204 (D. Mass. 2001) (finding no grounds for personal jurisdiction over a company but
finding personal jurisdiction over a agent). But see, e.g., Research Sys. Corp. v. IPSOS Publicite,
276 F.3d 914, 926 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding personal jurisdiction over a French company); S&D
Trading Co., LLC v. AAFIS, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d. 558, 575 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (finding personal
jurisdiction over a Chinese trading company).
538 See, e.g., PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 255-61 (analyzing several public and private interest
factors that the court must take into consideration when facing a motion for forum non conveniens
and concluding that the United States was not a convenient forum).
535 18 U.S.C.
536
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jurisdiction and forum non conveniens should be understood differently in the
context of state trade secret claims. 39 Courts should allow such claims to go forward
keeping in mind the potential adverse effects of allowing trade secret
misappropriation by foreign entities from not being adequately remedied. The
broader implication of more permissive jurisdictional rules in these cases would be to
mitigate the need for the Economic Espionage Act in cases where a foreign entity is
the ultimate culprit.

3. Civil versus CriminalEnforcement of IntellectualProperty
Trade secret misappropriation is a blend of tort and property. As Justice
540
Holmes famously stated in E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Mas]and,
liability for trade secret misappropriation rests on culpable conduct in the form of
breach of confidence. 5 41 However, trade secret law evolved to be property-like with
misappropriation actions designed to protect the property rights of an owner, usually
5 42
a firm, against a range of unauthorized uses by an employee or a competitor.
Given this evolution, it is not surprising that trade secret law has moved in the
direction of criminal law with the Economic Espionage Act. 543 While my previous two
reform proposals were designed to address the Act's federalization of intellectual
property in order to facilitate prosecutions against non-United States entities, the
last proposal addresses the problems of criminalizing trade secret law.
Criminalization of conduct can have chilling effects on the legitimate movement
of labor and information across firms and across borders. The scholarly work on high
velocity labor markets demonstrates this point. 544 The discussion in this paper of the
implications for cross-border movement of people and information shows that the
chilling effects can affect international trade.5 45 An important step in mitigating the
adverse effects of federal criminal trade secret law is to have the law focus on trade
secret misappropriation as a crime against property rather than as a broad deterrent
to improper conduct.5 46 By focusing on the theft of property, the effects of criminal
trade secret law on the legitimate flow of people and information can be limited.

539 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) ("As has long
been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant only so long as there exist "minimum contacts" between the defendant and
the forum State." (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))).
540 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
541 Id. at 102 ("[Tihe starting point for the present matter [trade secret misappropriation] is not

property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the
plaintiffs, or one of them.").

542 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04, 1004 n.9 (1984) (treating a trade
secret as property for Fifth Amendment Taking Clause analysis).
543 See Carr, supra note 51, at 161-63 (listing some of the astounding actions against American
businesses that led to the passage of the Economic Espionage Act).
544 See, e.g., SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 15, at 29-57 (analyzing the growth

of the Silicon Valley job market).
545 See, e.g., DIXIT & NORMAN, supra note 45, at 146-49 (indicating that labor migration can
affect international trade).
546 See, e.g., Ruckeishaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04, 1004 n.9 (treating a trade secret as property for
Fifth Amendment Taking Clause analysis).
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My proposal may at first seem to contradict the purposes of the Economic
Espionage Act. As Senator Specter noted in the legislative history of the Act:
[A] major problem for law enforcement in responding to the increase in
such thefts has been a glaring gap in Federal law. For many years, the
United States has had a variety of theft statutes in the United States Code.
These laws are derived primarily from the common law of theft. For
example, it violates Federal law to move stolen property across State lines.
In order to violate such laws, however, the courts have held that the
property stolen cannot be intangible property, such as trade secrets or
intellectual property. In addition, theft usually requires that the thief take
the property with the intention of depriving the lawful owner of its use. But
such a test i[s] useless when a person copies software and leaves the
original software with the lawful owner, taking only the secrets on the
software but leaving the physical property. The lawful owner still has full
547
use of the property, but its value is significantly reduced.
The Economic Espionage Act corrected the inadequacies of prior criminal law
that required theft of physical property and thereby ignored the economic harms
caused by theft of intangible information. 548 I am not suggesting that we limit trade
secret misappropriation claims to theft of tangible property.
Instead, I am
suggesting that the Economic Espionage Act has moved too far, permitting
convictions on facts in which concrete and valuable information may not be at issue
at all.
If trade secret misappropriation is to be criminalized, then the burden should be
a substantial one upon the government to demonstrate that the company has been
injured by the actions of the defendants. Based upon my reading of the case law
under the Economic Espionage Act, the burden on the government is fairly low given
the potential adverse consequences on the movement of people and information
globally.5 49 In fact, the heightened burden on the government is consistent with
550
prosecutions by the few states that have enacted criminal trade secret statutes.
States enacted criminal trade secret statutes to correct the inadequacy of traditional
criminal theft statutes in protecting against appropriation of intangible
information.55 1 State courts have placed a high burden on prosecution.55 2 For
example, in People v. Pribih, the California Court of Appeals for the Second District
overturned a conviction under the state criminal trade secret statute because the
S12208 (1996) (statement of Sen. Specter).
See id.
549 See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 630-31 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (convicting the
defendant of the inchoate offense of attempted misappropriation of a trade secret, even though all or
nearly all of the knowledge contained within the "attempt" was publicly known).
550 See MILGRIM, supra note 504, § 12.06; see also GHOSH ET AL., supra note 504, at 65-71
547 142 CONG. REC.
548

(discussing state criminal trade secret statutes).
551 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Engelman, 142 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Mass. 1957) (holding that the
theft of trade secrets was not included under larceny statute).
552 See, e.g., People v. Pribich, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no trade
secret misappropriation because the prosecution did not offer any evidence at trial that the
information would give a competitor a competitive advantage).
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prosecution had failed to show that the information at issue would give "one who
uses it an advantage over competitors."553 A similar burden should be imposed in
federal prosecutions under the Economic Espionage Act.
My proposal is also consistent with other federal statutes governing intellectual
property and computer crimes. 55 4 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, enacted
twelve years before the Economic Espionage Act, criminalizes unauthorized access to
computer systems.55 5 The Act, however, imposes a $5000 threshold for damages to
the system in order for a prosecution to proceed. 556 Similarly, the No Economic Theft
Act imposes a $1000 threshold for copyright infringement through electronic means if
55 7
the infringement is not undertaken for commercial gain or personal benefit.
Similar monetary thresholds for prosecutions under the Economic Espionage Act
would alleviate some of the concerns with the chilling effect of the Act on legitimate
employee mobility. If the prosecutor had to prove a baseline level of economic harm
before proceeding on a case, prosecutions may be less likely and only economically
harmful prosecutions will be pursued. Of course, the threshold would have to be set
at an amount that would balance the chilling effects with the deterrent effects of the
prosecution.
Making this move requires prosecution of clear cases involving trade secrets that
have been embodied in some form that can be recognized as property. 558 Cases
brought on evidence of enticement of employees by competing employers or the
transfer of knowledge would be suspect under this proposed approach.55 9 If trade
secret law is to be criminalized, the guilty act should entail the transfer or attempted
transfer of well-developed trade secrets whose market value is unambiguous and
whose value as confidential information is established beyond a reasonable doubt.
What this means in practice is that the prosecutor has to show that the defendant
either appropriated or attempted to appropriate concrete trade secrets.
Furthermore, the focus of the prosecution is not on the bad conduct of the defendant
but on the subject matter that was the basis for the appropriation. The proposal
560
would challenge the use of sting operations in Economic Espionage Act cases.
While sting operations are justified as protecting legitimate interests in trade
secrets, 561 sting operations based on questionable or non-existent trade secrets can
have a chilling effect on the mobility of labor and information. 562 Sting operations

553Id. at 117.
554See, e.g., Computer Fraud & Abuse Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
555Id. § 1030(a).
556 Id. The statute has no monetary threshold for, among other cases, unauthorized access to
computers that involve medical treatment or diagnosis that causes physical harm to an individual or
harm to public safety, or is used by a government agency for administration of justice, national
security, or national defense. Id. § 1030(a)(3), (5).
55717 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006).
558 See id. (requiring a threshold value to be met before criminal prosecution is permitted).
559Without initially meeting the threshold limit, the interactions between potential defendants
would not likely rise to the level of trade secret misappropriation. CompareEconomic Espionage Act
of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (containing no monetary threshold), with Computer Fraud & Abuse
Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (containing a $5000 per one-year period monetary threshold).
560 See, e.g., United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 540-41 (6th Cir. 2002).
561 See id.
562 See, e.g., id.
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can be a basis for a prosecution if the government can show that there was a highly
probable risk that actual trade secrets were to be appropriated absent the sting. 56 3
Introducing a property requirement in criminal trade secret prosecutions should
not be confused with recognizing trade secrets as property akin to real property or
trade secret misappropriation as akin to trespass to land.56 4 Instead, the property
concept as I describe it here is designed to prevent prosecution of cases where the
5 65
process of knowledge transmission and the creation of spillovers may be deterred.
By requiring some concreteness in defining the subject of the misappropriation, the
cause of action does not become a broad-sweeping mandate to police any conduct that
might be deemed inappropriate. If trade secret is to be criminalized, a "big if'and
one that has irreversibly occurred with the passage of the Economic Espionage Act,
then the potential adverse consequences of criminal law on the movement of labor
and information can be limited by requiring that prosecution focus on cases where
concrete trade secrets that have been developed and perhaps even embodied in a
tangible form is the subject of appropriation. The shift to property in criminal trade
secret law can cure the overzealous prosecution of undifferentiated and ambiguous
56 6
conduct.

CONCLUSION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE BOUNDARY OF THE NATION

Intellectual property law is about progress, in the grand sense of the
development of society and knowledge.56 7 In a more banal sense, intellectual
property law is about movement, the flow of creations and innovations into the
marketplace and the transformation of ideas into practical applications.5 68 This
Article has made the case for how intellectual property affects the movement of
people, particularly the way in which people serve as vectors for ideas and ideas
serve to inform and attract people. 569 Such movement occurs through the institution
of firms and also the institution of the nation-state.5 70 Through its effects on the
movement of people and ideas, intellectual property serves to demarcate and regulate
5 71
the boundaries of firms and of nations.
563

See id.

564 See, e.g., Hyde, The Wealth of Shared Information, supra note 15 (indicating that the
traditional legal notions of property may need to be relaxed as related to trade secret law).
565 See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 632, 628-31 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (convicting the
defendant of the inchoate offense of attempted misappropriation of a trade secret, even though all or
nearly all of the knowledge contained within the "attempt" was publicly known).
566 See generally LEE WITH ZIA, supra note 478 (chronicling the FBI's false accusation of
espionage against Wen Ho Lee).
567 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.").
568 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2006) (allowing an inventor patent rights for his or her
invention in exchange for a full, enabling public disclosure of the invention).
569 See supra Section II.B.
570 See, e.g., SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18, at 274-324 (documenting the
growth of India's economy as related to the information technology business sector).
571 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 184-85 (requiring individuals to obtain license from the U.S. before
obtaining foreign patent rights, and prohibiting individuals and corporations from obtaining U.S.
patent rights if the entity filed a foreign patent application prior to obtaining the license).
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By considering the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, I have both illustrated my
thesis that intellectual property law affects the movement people and presented the
argument for open borders and fluid boundaries in the promotion of innovation. But
this defense of openness should not be seen as a turn against law. In fact, the goal of
free movement of people and ideas supports the case for the enforcement of federal
criminal trade secret law in property terms. 572 The focus on conduct in the Economic
Espionage Act, as demonstrated by the criminalization of a civil cause of action,
interferes with the functioning of high velocity labor markets. A turn towards
criminal enforcement based on misappropriation of clear property interests militates
against this turn. In analyzing the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, my conclusion is
that it is an unnecessary piece of legislation. Reforms in traditional intellectual
property law should satisfy some of the more plausible concerns raised in defense of
the Act. But as a result of political compromise and social fears, the Act will not
vanish soon. I hope that the arguments here place our understanding of the Act in
its proper perspective, serve in the formulation of reforms that limit its potential
harmful effects on international trade in information, and, most importantly, aid in
understanding the role of intellectual property law in shaping global markets.

572 See SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 18, at 184.

